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ABSTRACT 
The structure of New Zealand’s Consumers Price Index has changed many times 
over its 100 year history. As New Zealand’s most influential and consequential 
official statistic the CPI performs political and distributional functions that affects 
‘who gets what and when’. Some observers suggest that change in the structure of 
the CPI is merely the consequence of technological improvement which in turn 
alters the conduct of policy-making and politics.  
This study turns that assumption on its head by demonstrating that it is politics 
that has altered the technology known as the CPI. Through the examination and 
evaluation of the changing political and economic context that the index operates 
within, this thesis work finds that the CPI was transformed by the very political 
forces it was designed to contain.   
This thesis argues that because the index functions as political decision-making 
tool that supports the setting of salaries and wages, benefit levels and interest rates, 
change in the form of the index is a result of struggle among interests affected by 
these highly political decisions.  
This thesis makes its case through analysis of primary sources and official 
documentation relating to the development of the index.  The first case study 
tracks the origins of the first official index in 1914, devised in order to learn what it 
cost a ‘working’ family to meet its basic needs through its transformation into a 
tool that set wages and measured price change in the wider economy.  This is 
reinforced by a study of change to the index since the 1970s, focusing on the use 
of the CPI in the conduct of monetary policy that resulted in a politically driven 
change to the measurement of household inflation.  These case studies are further 
supported by examination of the secondary literature on price indexes, monetary 
policy and institutional change theory.  
This thesis adds to the body of knowledge on theories of institutional change by 
presenting evidence of the conflict that has caused political change to the 
technology of the CPI. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE PROBLEM 
Many New Zealanders view the Consumers Price Index (CPI) as a politically 
neutral device that measures the relative change in price levels of goods and 
services.   Most people regard the CPI as an ‘objective’ instrument, yet, by its very 
nature it is political.  Once based on the subjective idea of the ‘standard of living’ 
of a ‘working man’, the index is now based on an ‘objective’ measure of aggregate 
household consumption.  Items that had previously been excluded from the CPI 
‘basket of goods’ such as alcohol and holiday travel, are included, yet despite its 
professed objectivity, interest and credit services are now excluded.  From being a 
decision-making tool used by the Court of Arbitration in wage setting, the index 
has become a monetary policy ‘target’ of the Reserve Bank.    
Inflation has been argued to be “the outcome of political conflicts”.1  Different 
rates of price change affect the distribution of economic production to different 
groups and coalitions in society. But not only is the rate of inflation the outcome 
of political conflict, so too is the statistic commonly used to measure it in New 
Zealand – the Consumers Price Index.  
The creation and evolution of the CPI is a profoundly political story.  Over its 100 
year history, the CPI has been linked to political, economic and social change in 
New Zealand.  Accordingly, its design and usage are products of political struggle.  
What was first conceived as a tool of state interventionism in pursuit of the 
‘makeable society’ at the beginning of the 20th Century has become, under the 
prevailing philosophy of market liberalism of the 21st Century, an instrument to 
‘bind the hands of government’.   
This study examines how the CPI was transformed by the political forces it was 
designed to contain.  Classical liberals and Marxists view social and political 
development as a consequence of exogenous technological change. This research 
turns this assumption on its head by asking “Is technology political?”, “Does 
technology shape politics or is technology shaped by politics?” and “If technology 
is influenced by politics, how?” 
Official statistics are the cornerstone of contemporary governance. The Statistics 
Act states that official statistics are to be used by government, business and the 
public for the “purpose of making policy decisions, and to facilitate the 
                                                          
1
 Kirshner, Jonathan, 2001, ‘The Political Economy of Low Inflation.’ Journal of Economic Surveys 15(1), pp. 41-
70. 
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appreciation of economic, social, demographic, and other matters of interest.”2 
Gross domestic product (GDP), the balance of payments and the CPI quantify 
economic phenomena that influence political decisions and outcomes. When 
deployed as ‘objective facts’ normative arguments can stem from these numbers, a 
decrease in GDP is ‘bad’ whereas a positive balance of payments is ‘good’. Yet 
little attention is directed to the political epistemology of the numbers themselves. 
Rather than the ‘objective facts’ they are commonly accepted as, official statistics 
are coloured by the economy, society and politics they are the creations of.  
1.2 THE CPI AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 
The CPI is New Zealand’s most influential and consequential official statistic. The 
quantification of inflation measured by the CPI affects who gets what and when.  
This political institution measures the rate of price change in goods and services 
purchased by households. The quantification of price change represented by the 
CPI is responsible for the movement of billions of dollars annually both as a 
formal measure of inflation and an informal measure of the ‘cost of living’. It was 
recently estimated that a 0.1 percentage point overestimate in the CPI would 
increase annual government expenditure by $16 million.3 As a target for the setting 
of monetary policy, the level of the CPI is a determinant in the level of interest 
rates, which influences investment decisions. The CPI is linked to the level of 
exports, imports, employment and exchange rates. Yet despite the significant 
political consequence of the index most contemporary New Zealanders view the 
CPI as a politically neutral device. A recent survey of public trust in official 
statistics found that 80% of respondents felt that statistics published by Statistics 
New Zealand (New Zealand’s official statistics agency) were either ‘very free’ or 
‘reasonably free’ from political interference.4  The Statistics Act 1975 provides 
statutory independence to the Government Statistician, stating that this official 
“shall have the sole responsibility for deciding the procedures and methods 
employed in the provision of any statistics produced”.    
Yet the composition of the CPI is determined by a series of political, more so than 
rational or technological choices over time. Technically, there are many different 
ways to measure price change therefore the idea of one optimal choice to measure 
inflation is false.  In addition, because New Zealand is one of few developed 
                                                          
2
 The Statistics Act 1975 
3
 Office of the Minister of Statistics, 2011, ‘Statistics 2020: Achieving the Statistical  System of  the  Future’ 
Budget Cabinet Paper June 2011, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/downloads/pdfs/b11-2020979.pdf 
4
 Research New Zealand, 2014, Use and Trust in Official Statistics Survey: 2013. 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/~/media/Statistics/about-us/corporate-publications/use-trust-os-survey/use-trust-
os-survey-2013.pdf , p. 41 
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countries to have a single ‘catch-all’ index that is used for multiple economic and 
political purposes, the structure of the index is a site of on-going political struggle. 
This thesis, however, is not an attack on the independence or professional integrity 
of the Government Statistician and Statistics New Zealand. Instead it will 
demonstrate that the belief that official statistics numbers are politically neutral is 
misguided because while “God made the integers, all else is the work of man.”5  
1.3 THE POLITICS OF THE CPI 
The CPI is a profoundly political institution, what today is seen as an ‘objective’ 
measure of price change is the cumulative outcome of historical and contemporary 
power-political relations. Change in the CPI has tended to occur incrementally 
through the exploitation of ambiguities in its conceptual basis and application of 
the statistic. The basis of the CPI was originally a prescriptive measure of the 
‘workingman’s cost of living’, which, over time became a positivist measure of 
price change in the purchases of a sample of all New Zealand households.  In its 
first iteration, during the Great War, the CPI was used primarily in the adjustment 
of wages for the ‘cost of living’ by the Court of Arbitration.6  Today the foremost 
use of the CPI is as an ‘inflation target’ for the Governor of the Reserve Bank who 
is responsible for controlling the rate of price change.  In essence, where the CPI 
was first developed a century ago to arbitrate the price of labour, it now adjudicates 
the price of capital. First conceived as a social tool of state interventionism in 
pursuit of the ‘makeable society’, the CPI is now, (in its monetary policy guise) an 
economic device of market liberalism used to ‘bind the hands of government’.   
The contemporary CPI measures price change in a representative sample of 
household purchases intended to reflect the present social and economic context.  
Generally, the scope of the statistic has expanded over time as the index has 
become more positivist and less prescriptive.  Measurement of price change in 
alcoholic drinks and pornographic magazines, once excluded for moral and 
political reasons under the prescriptive approach, were added to the index in the 
decades following World War II.  But in 1999 the long trend of expansion in the 
scope of the CPI was reversed when measurement of price change in interest rates 
was abandoned.  
                                                          
5
 Jeremy Gray (translation), 2008, Plato's Ghost: The Modernist Transformation of Mathematics, Princeton 
University Press, p. 153. Gray attributes the German quote to: “Weber 1891/92, 19, quoting from a lecture of 
Kronecker's of 1886.” 
6
 The CPI was officially named the ‘Retail Price Index’ until 1949 when it became the Consumers’ Price Index.  
The apostrophe was discarded in 1973.  This study will use the term ‘Consumers Price Index’ to refer to the 
index irrespective of the time period. 
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The justification for this change was that the inclusion of interest rates made the 
index too volatile for use by the Reserve Bank in monetary policy.  As interest rates 
were raised in the hope of reducing inflation, the increased price of money would 
be reflected in the CPI (which included interest in its ‘basket’) which the Bank 
argued would create a ‘feedback loop’ where attempts to reduce inflation could 
cause higher inflation to be observed in the CPI.   
On the other hand, representatives of workers and welfare recipients were strongly 
opposed to this change.  Rather than seeing the CPI a tool to control inflation, 
they viewed the CPI primarily as a tool that allowed wage and welfare payments to 
keep pace with the ‘cost of living’ through indexation.  From this perspective the 
removal of interest rates (which made up approximately 6.5% of the CPI ‘basket’) 
distorted the CPI’s quantification of the ‘cost of living’. The political victory of the 
interests of certain groups and coalitions over others in the enactment of central 
bank ‘independence’ was not only reflected in politics of ‘inflation targeting’ it was 
mirrored in the construction of the CPI itself. 
This particular episode highlighted the inherently political nature of the CPI.  As a 
statistic with multiple disparate purposes, it is, as former Government Statistician 
Len Cook states, “impossible for any one index to meet the needs of all users”.7  
With multiple interests competing to influence ‘who gets what, when, and how’ 
from the outcomes of a statistic with such inherent ambiguity, the CPI cannot be 
anything but a political construction.  The CPI, like other institutions, is embedded 
within a political context reflecting the cumulative preferences of historic and 
contemporary change agents. Therefore this study is primarily concerned with how 
and why institutions change over time.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Len Cook, 1989, “A Sample of Highlights in the History of Government Statistics.” The New Zealand 
Statistician 24(2), pp. 57-65. 
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1.4 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study will address the following questions:  
i. Is change in New Zealand’s CPI driven primarily by technological 
improvement or is it primarily driven by politics? 
ii. Why did the basis of the CPI changed from a generally prescriptive measure 
of the ‘cost of living’ to a generally positivist measure of ‘inflation’? 
iii. Why did the removal of mortgage interest from the CPI regimen in 1999 
occur? 
iv. How has the process of change in the CPI occurred?  
From a theoretical perspective, this thesis will also address the following questions: 
i. Are these significant changes in the CPI examples of sudden or incremental 
change? 
ii. Does ‘path dependence’ or ‘layering and conversion’ adequately explain the 
process of institutional change in the CPI? 
The investigation of these questions entails the analysis of two specific episodes of 
change in the CPI:  
1) The transformation of the prescriptive Retail Price Index into the positivist 
CPI that occurred over the first half of the 20th century.  
2) The removal of interest from the scope of the official CPI in the late 1990s. 
 A case study design is appropriate as it allows in-depth investigation of the 
processes and outcomes behind these specific episodes of change while drawing 
general inferences from these cases to a broader class of cases.  
There are several reasons for the singular focus on New Zealand’s CPI.  The 
temporal and resource limitations imposed on a Master of Arts thesis and the 
paucity of existing research on New Zealand’s CPI necessarily restrict the scope of 
this study.  Presently the body of social science research into price indexes is 
minuscule even at the global level.  Therefore one must choose between shallow 
comparative examinations of multiple national price indexes or a thorough 
evaluation of a single price index.  Substantive research needs to be conducted on 
the price index systems of individual economies to allow informed comparative 
study to occur.  Aside from a historical side-project of Statistics New Zealand to 
commemorate the recent centenary of the index, the body of existing social 
research on New Zealand’s CPI is virtually non-existent.  This thesis, therefore, 
offers a limited and by no means exhaustive historical examination of the 
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development of the CPI underpinned by power-political relationships that alter 
institutions over time.  
This thesis draws upon a combination of primary documentation and secondary 
literature.  In analysing the development of the CPI, the thesis will examine the 
official documentation published by Statistics New Zealand and others that details 
the development and utilisation of the statistic.  This thesis will also consult the 
secondary literature on the history and development of price indexes in the social 
science and economic fields.   This study will also provide context through 
consulting the literature in regards to New Zealand’s economic, social and political 
history.  
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This thesis will identify the causes and rationales of change in the CPI through 
examining historical power-political relationships and the exploitation of 
ambiguities in the basis and application of the statistic by dominant change agents. 
The following chapter provides an overview of how the CPI has been constructed 
and utilised historically and contemporaneously.  The chapter also examines 
ambiguities in the basis and purpose of the CPI as well as the relationship between 
change in the methodology of the CPI and it’s utilisation in New Zealand society. 
Explanations for CPI change in literature on price indexes and statistics are 
evaluated as is the body of literature on institutional change.  
Chapter three examines the process of change in the CPI from its genesis during 
the Great War as the prescriptive Retail Price Index to its post-WWII 
transformation into the ‘positivist’ CPI.  The chapter identifies explanations for the 
development of the CPI within changing domestic and international power-
political relations that change interpretations of the conceptual basis of the statistic.  
The chapter concludes by evaluating how this story corresponds with existing 
theories on institutional change.  
The fourth chapter examines the change in the CPI in the latter decades of the 20th 
century with particular focus on the removal of mortgage interest from the scope 
of the CPI in the late 1990s.  The chapter links this episode of technological 
change to the implementation of market liberal policies, deregulation and change in 
New Zealand politics and society that began in earnest following the 1984 election 
of the fourth Labour government.  The chapter concludes by evaluating this case 
study within the context of institutional change theory and comparing this episode 
of CPI change with that outlined in chapter three. 
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The concluding chapter of this thesis summarises these studies of CPI change and 
speculates on what the circumstances of change in the CPI means for other forms 
of constructed knowledge, in particular, developing statistical measures such 
happiness indicators and measures of climate change.   Further areas of research in 
the field of institutional change and the social scientific study of price indexes and 
official statistics are identified. This thesis concludes by using these case studies to 
speculate on the future of the CPI within New Zealand’s political economy. 
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CHAPTER 2 – AN OVERVIEW OF CHANGE IN THE CPI 
2.1 SUMMARY 
This chapter examines the role of the CPI in contemporary and historical New 
Zealand society.  It commences with an overview of the role of the CPI in 
contemporary New Zealand.  A range of the historical changes to the calculation 
of the index are identified.  This investigation is paired with an overview that 
examines the different ways the index has been utilised in New Zealand society.  
This will demonstrate the linkage between the political purposes that the CPI 
serves and the methodology of the index itself. The second section of the chapter 
evaluates explanations for CPI change in existing literature.  Explanations in 
technical and economic studies of price indexes and related statistics will be 
identified. The limited range of works in the social sciences devoted to price 
indexes and statistics are evaluated followed by a brief overview of literature 
regarding New Zealand’s social and economic history as it relates to the index.   
Turning from the empirical, theoretical explanations for institutional change are 
assessed with particular focus on the historical institutionalist school.  The chapter 
concludes by outlining the scope, methodology and research questions used in the 
subsequent chapters.  
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
In 1948, a government appointed committee tasked with devising a revised ‘cost-
of-living index’ recommended a series of statistical techniques and methods that 
transformed the ‘Retail Price Index’ into the ‘Consumers’ Price Index’.  Unlike its 
predecessor, based on a ‘workingman’s cost of living’, the remade statistic was 
based upon “the whole range of commodities and services used in the “average 
household” representing “the amenities of modern living”.8  Almost half a century 
later, another government committee recommended, for the first time in history, a 
significant contraction in the scope of the CPI.  To ensure greater ‘accuracy’ and 
lessen ‘short-term volatility’, household debt-service payments (such as mortgage 
interest) were removed from measurement in the official index.  
These episodes of change to the CPI in the aftermath of WWII and the late 1990s 
share a commonality in that they were political, rather than ‘scientific’ decisions.  
These choices, which determined how New Zealand’s national price index would 
be calculated, coincided with the prevailing domestic and international political-
economic consensus of the time.  The post-WWII change to a positivist index 
                                                          
8
 Statistics Office. 1949, Monthly Abstract of Statistics, November 30 1949. Wellington: Government Printer. 
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based on ‘modern living’ reflected the broad balance of ‘embedded liberalism’ 
struck between labour and capital under the Bretton Woods system.  The 
transition to an ‘interest-free’ CPI in the late-1990s on the other hand was paired 
to the predominance of liberal market policies and the increased influence of the 
financial sector over government. 
These changes were in part the result of the interaction of ideas, interests and 
institutions and exogenous factors. But these changes, while they may superficially 
appear to be so, were not sudden as the impetus for change was built up 
incrementally over time.  But a shift in the balance of political power is not an 
adequate explanation of the reasons for CPI change.  To overcome the historical 
legacy of the index in society, ‘change actors’ exploited ambiguities, 
misunderstandings and inconsistencies in the CPI system to bring about change.   
To understand how these ambiguities and inconsistencies in the CPI system were 
used to bring about change, one must understand how the CPI is constructed and 
how it is utilised in New Zealand society.  
2.3 THE CPI SYSTEM 
A price index quantifies price change by measuring “the change in price between 
time periods for a given set of goods and services”.9  New Zealand’s CPI is 
currently based upon the price change observed in a ‘basket of goods’ that 
represents domestic spending.  Change measured in the value of the index over 
time is then utilised to make economic and political decisions regarding the 
distribution of resources.  
Yet this simple definition portends a complex array of choices: Which goods and 
services are measured and which are not? Whose ‘price change’ is being measured 
and what is the ‘representative consumer’ of these goods and services? Is the value 
of every dollar spent treated equally (plutocratic) or are the spending patterns of 
each ‘representative consumer’ treated equally (democratic)?  How is the CPI used 
to allocate resources? Furthermore why has the CPI been adopted as a distributive 
tool over other devices that may have equal or better technical merit? This 
dilemma is further exacerbated by the fact that the CPI serves multiple purposes of 
which it is not optimally suited.  
                                                          
9
 Statistics New Zealand, 2014, ‘Consumers Price Index: June 2014 Quarter: Definitions’, July 16 2014, 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/economic_indicators/CPI_inflation/ConsumersPriceIndex_HOTPJu
n14qtr/Definitions.aspx  
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Rather than viewing the index as a number alone, the political and economic 
importance of the CPI is as a ‘system’ that attempts to both mitigate the effects of, 
and control the rate of price change. This ‘system’ comprises a ‘form’ (the CPI 
itself) and ‘function’ (what is done with the statistic).10  Much of the political 
tension in the index stems from the competing objectives between and within the 
form and function of the CPI system.  
Officially, the CPI is a metric of ‘household inflation’ that measures “the changing 
price of a fixed basket of goods and services” representing “the overall expenditure 
pattern of New Zealand households.”11  But, despite not officially being so since at 
least the late 1940s, the CPI also serves as an informal measure of the ‘cost of 
living’.   
Although often seen as synonymous, ‘inflation’ and the ‘cost of living’ are distinct 
and separate economic phenomena.  The ‘cost of living’ is generally defined as the 
rate of change in the amount of resources required to maintain a fixed amount of 
satisfaction over a period over time.  On the other hand ‘inflation’ in the New 
Zealand CPI is the rate of price change in an aggregate cross-section of goods and 
services purchased by New Zealand households.  Essentially ‘inflation’ measures 
the ‘cost of things’ rather than the ‘cost of living’.  Therefore the CPI as a measure 
of inflation includes items such as luxury goods that would not normally be 
considered as part of the ‘cost of living’ while a cost of living index may exclude 
items with high levels of consumption such as alcohol. As the index is based on 
aggregate consumption, the purchasing patterns of higher income households have 
greater influence on the contemporary CPI than lower income households.   
The two overlapping but distinct forms of measuring price change are reflected in 
the two broad functions the index performs.  As a ‘compensation index’ the index 
is used for ‘cost of living’ adjustments for many government transfer payments and 
income thresholds for state assistance.  As a ‘compensation index’ the CPI is an 
informative tool for employees, employers and businesses seeking to adjust wages, 
prices or profit to compensate for price change.  As an ‘inflation index’ the 
principal use of the CPI is to measure ‘price stability’ which is maintained through 
the monetary policy controlled by New Zealand’s Reserve Bank.  In essence, the 
CPI as a ‘compensation index’ mitigates the effects of price change while the CPI 
                                                          
10
 The terms ‘form’ and ‘function’ are taken from H. Spencer Banzaf, ‘The Form and Function of Price Indexes: 
A Historical Accounting’, History of Political Economy 36:4 2004 
11
 Statistics New Zealand, 2014, ‘Consumers Price Index: June 2014 Quarter: Definitions’, July 16 2014, 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/economic_indicators/CPI_inflation/ConsumersPriceIndex_HOTPJu
n14qtr/Definitions.aspx 
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as an ‘inflation index’ is used to identify and assist in the control of the underlying 
causes of price change.  
The method of calculating the CPI has considerable consequences in determining 
the outcomes it produces.  To ensure broad public acceptance of the integrity of 
the statistic, the Government Statistician (head of Statistics New Zealand and a 
non-political appointee of the State Services Commission) has the sole legal 
responsibility “for deciding the procedures and methods employed in the provision 
of any statistics produced or to be produced by the Statistician, and shall also have 
the sole responsibility for deciding the extent, form, and timing of publication of 
those statistics.”12  Yet the legislative protection extended to the CPI does not 
preclude politics from influencing the form of the statistic.   
A fundamental principle of most national statistical offices is that the numbers they 
produce must be ‘fit-for-purpose’.  The Inter-Secretariat Working Group on Price 
Statistics (IWGPS), the international body that co-ordinates international practices 
of price index composition, recommends that Government Statisticians regularly 
consult with users of their statistics to ensure the numbers are meeting their needs 
and requirements.  New Zealand is no exception to this practice, but unlike many 
other developed countries with multiple indexes performing multiple functions, the 
New Zealand CPI essentially has one form that performs multiple functions, which 
means compromises must be made.  These compromises balance between the 
historical institutional characteristics of the CPI, the preferences of the dominant 
change agents and the contemporary political context.  
Over the history of the index, such compromises have tended to favour the most 
politically powerful users of the index.  For much of the first 50 years of the 
index’s existence, the most prominent user of the CPI was the Court of Arbitration 
which used the index as a guide for the ‘cost of living’ in the determining wages for 
most New Zealand workers.  In the past two decades the Reserve Bank has been 
the most politically significant user of the CPI, which is used to evaluate the 
monetary policy ‘target’ of ‘price stability’ for the Bank.   
In the 1920s the scope of the CPI was vastly broadened because of the Court of 
Arbitration’s wage determination requirements.  In the 1990s it was the needs of 
the Reserve Bank that prompted the removal of mortgage interest rates from the 
CPI.  Despite the form of the CPI being legislatively separate from the functions 
that it performs; political change in the way the index is used, can and does change 
the form of the statistic itself.  
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But change in the form of the index can also occur without any corresponding 
change in the redistributive functions of the statistic.  A CPI designed within 
approved international standards permits cross-border comparisons of price 
change, increasing certainty reducing the transaction costs of international trade.  A 
primary factor in the initial creation of the index in the 1910s was the desire for 
Imperial comparability of prices across the British Empire.  There is an argument 
that the post-WWII conceptual changes to the CPI, can to a degree, be linked to 
international rather than domestic causes.  Although the removal of interest from 
the index in the 1990s has definite links to the imposition of market liberal policies 
such as central bank ‘independence’; this change was also co-ordinated with 
Australian institutions, suggesting that the politics of regionalism may be just as 
salient as domestic politics in bringing about change to the form of the index. 
2.4 THE ‘FUNCTION’ OF THE CPI 
The CPI as a measure of inflation serves as an essential indicator in the ‘dashboard’ 
of modern government.  The contemporary approach to governance in New 
Zealand views the nation-state as a ‘machine’ to be tuned, aligned and calibrated 
according to the perceived conditions.  Under the prevailing monetary policy 
framework of ‘inflation targeting’, the CPI can function as a speedometer for the 
pace of economic growth indicating whether the economy is ‘overheating’ and 
needs to be ‘slowed down’ (or ‘sped up’) by those with their hand on the lever.   
As an indexation tool, the CPI is a compensation mechanism that attempts to 
‘smooth over’ economic distribution between the ‘winners and losers’ as a result of 
price change over time.  This use of the CPI is used to enable payments and 
receipts to ‘keep pace’ with the value of money.   Payments such as social welfare 
benefits, student allowances, superannuation are adjusted yearly based on the rate 
of the CPI while some indirect taxes, such as excise taxes on alcohol, petrol and 
tobacco products are adjusted by the CPI annually.  In the private sector, clauses 
invoking adjustments for the CPI often appear in long-term employment or 
investment agreements and contracts. 
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TABLE 1: GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS AND RECEIPTS LINKED TO 
THE CONSUMERS PRICE INDEX 
 CPI index utilised Effective from 
Revenue   
Alcoholic beverages excise duty CPI All Groups less Credit Services 1 July each 
year 
   
Tobacco products excise duty CPI All Groups less Credit Services 1 January each 
year 
   
Motor Spirits excise duty CPI All Groups less Credit Services 1 July 2016, 
then annually 
   
Benefits   
Family Tax Credit entitlements within the 
Working for Families Package 
Consumers Price Index Normally 1 
April after 
cumulative 
increase has 
occurred 
War Pensions - Rates of Pensions, Lump Sum 
Payments, and Allowances 
CPI All Groups excluding cigarettes 
and other tobacco products 
1 April each 
year 
Social Security - Rates of Benefits and 
Allowances (including NZ Super & Student Loan 
living costs) 
CPI All Groups excluding cigarettes 
and other tobacco products 
1 April each 
year 
Social Security - Temporary Additional Support Actual rentals for the housing 
component in the CPI for clause 
3(a); otherwise CPI all Groups 
excluding cigarettes and other 
tobacco products 
1 April each 
year 
Social Security - Childcare Assistance CPI All Groups excluding cigarettes 
and other tobacco products 
1 April each 
year 
Home-based care - maximum income 
exemption for home-based education and care 
of a child 
CPI All Groups excluding cigarettes 
and other tobacco products 
1 April each 
year 
Social Security - Long-term residential care CPI All Groups excluding cigarettes 
and other tobacco products 
1 April each 
year 
Health Entitlement Cards CPI All Groups excluding cigarettes 
and other tobacco products 
1 April each 
year 
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2.5 WHAT IS THE CPI? (‘FORM’) 
Since its inception the CPI has taken the form of an index number that shows the 
change in the price of items over time. An index number is a data figure that 
reflects change in price compared with a ‘base value’. The base usually equals 100 
(or 1000) and the index number is usually expressed in ratio to the base value. For 
example, if an item costs twice as much in 1985 as it did in 1975, its index number 
would be 200 relative to 100 in 1975. One of the key reasons that index numbers 
are used for the CPI and other statistics is they enable the translation of often 
complex statistical data into easily understood terms. 
As its core the CPI measures the change in price over time of a representative 
‘basket’ of goods and services (referred to technically as the ‘regimen’). The 
representative contents of this ‘basket’ are chosen to match the conceptual basis of 
the index.  Price change in items which make up a larger proportion of the 
representative ‘basket’ will have greater effect on the CPI index number produced 
than items that make up a smaller proportion of the ‘basket’.  For example, a 1% 
change in the price of petrol in the modern index would have a more consequential 
effect on the index than a 1% price change in a less frequently purchased item such 
as knitting needles.    
The ‘representative consumer’ of the ‘basket’ is determined by the conceptual basis 
of the index, which can range from broadly positivist to broadly prescriptive.  An 
aggregate positivist representation of consumers treats money neutrally, meaning 
the spending patterns of households with greater expenditure have greater 
influence on the composition of the regimen than households with lesser 
expenditure.  A prescriptive approach on the other hand, sets out what a 
‘representative consumer’ ought to be purchasing and/or designates the spending 
patterns of a specific sector of the population as the ‘representative consumer’. 
Adjustment of the index ‘basket’ to adapt to technological change notwithstanding, 
the political choice of what is and what is not in the representative ‘basket’ has 
consequences for its output.  
In 1915 the conceptual basis of the index was defined to be the “ordinary 
necessaries and conventional comforts” that is “required for the mass of the 
people”.13  The CPI in 1949 measured price change in “the whole range of 
commodities and services used in the average household” representing “the 
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 Malcolm Fraser, 1915, Report on the Cost of Living in New Zealand 1891-1914, Wellington: Government 
Printer, p. 7 
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amenities of modern living” whereas the CPI in 2011 measured “the rate of price 
change of goods and services purchased by households.”    
Despite superficial similarities, these conceptual definitions shaped very different 
statistics.  The 1915 CPI was highly prescriptive in examining ‘necessaries’ and 
‘conventional comforts’, as it was designed to measure price change in what the 
government defined as the essentials that ‘the mass of people’ ought require to live.  
The 1915 CPI eschewed the measurement of price change in what were defined as 
luxuries such as alcohol, tobacco or holiday travel. 
The 1949 version of the CPI moved away from a prescriptive to a more objective 
approach preferring to measure price change in the ‘whole range’ of goods and 
services used in the ‘average household’ rather than the ‘mass of people’.  The shift 
to an average measure, in principle, meant that the households with higher 
outgoing would have greater influence on the composition of the index over time. 
At the same time, the presence of the word ‘used’ meant the index was not solely 
about what households purchased via a financial transaction, partially grounding 
the conceptual basis of the index as a ‘cost of living’ measure. Despite its new 
objective bent, the measure of price change in alcohol and holiday travel was 
excluded from the 1949 CPI.  
The contemporary form of the CPI represents an almost purely objective measure 
of price change. The index now measures the change in price of goods and services 
purchased by households at an aggregate level.  Price change representing almost 
the whole range of goods and services purchased by households are now included 
in the index, including alcohol and holiday travel.  Despite the professed objectivity 
of the modern index (of which the transition to was a political choice), politics still 
underpins its composition.  Representations of the price change of mortgage 
interest, gambling and illegal drugs are excluded from the index.  While there may 
be apolitical technical reasons for the non-measurement of the latter two items in 
the contemporary CPI, the removal of mortgage interest, a ‘service’ purchased by 
households that enables ownership of shelter, an essential human need, was 
ultimately a political decision made because of change to the political function of 
the CPI. 
2.6 THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FORM AND FUNCTION  
Despite its ubiquity in the contemporary economy the epistemology of the CPI is 
rarely examined.  The CPI as currently produced is commonly seen as an objective 
‘fact’, with its ‘accuracy’ only constrained by the resources devoted to producing 
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the statistic.  Aside from those who specialise in its study, there is little discussion 
or debate over what is actually being measured and how it is done so.  It is 
assumed by many that the CPI measure is the ‘best practice’, and as the CPI is 
sealed off from ‘politics’ (given the statutory independence of the Government 
Statistician), change in the composition of the index is the consequence of 
technological innovation. Yet the underlying conception of what the CPI is – how 
it measures ‘inflation’, whose ‘inflation’ the index measures and for what purpose – 
is deeply political. 
While the areas of political struggle over a complex statistic such as the CPI can be 
numerous, essentially the political debate over the purpose of the CPI comes down 
to tension between the two phenomena the CPI is commonly seen to represent – 
‘inflation’ and the ‘cost of living’ and the functions the index performs to address 
those two phenomena.  
While the CPI is officially defined as a measure of ‘inflation’, as a convention, the 
meaning the contemporary CPI conveys is often unclear.  From its original 
conception as a measure of the ‘cost of living’ the CPI became an official measure 
of ‘household inflation’ in the late 1940s. Yet it is still viewed by many New 
Zealanders as a measure of the ‘cost of living’.14 This is in part due to the 
continued absence of any official measure of the ‘cost of living’ and the persistent 
use of the CPI as a tool to maintain purchasing power through indexation of wages 
and benefits. 
Although often used interchangeably, there are major conceptual differences 
between the two concepts.  Essentially, the CPI as ‘inflation’ is a positivist 
approach that measures the ‘cost of stuff’ by treating (almost) every dollar spent by 
households equally irrespective of the essentiality of goods and services purchased.  
A ‘cost of living’ approach is more prescriptive in that it measures the price change 
in maintaining a set amount of utility or satisfaction. 
Even in its positivist guise as a measure of ‘household inflation’ the CPI is used in 
used in ways that would not have been anticipated by its creators.  Arguably the 
most consequential use of the contemporary index is as a monetary policy ‘target’ 
for the Reserve Bank, where the Governor of the bank is contractually required to 
keep ‘underlying’ CPI inflation between 1 and 3 per cent per annum.15  Yet the CPI 
only measures inflation in households which comprise approximately 60% of New 
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Zealand’s economic activity.  Therefore the CPI is used, in effect, to determine the 
price of money for the entire economy.   
The choice to use the CPI as a ‘target’ monetary policy was essentially political, it 
was selected by politicians to be the yardstick for the Bank not because of its 
intrinsic qualities as an economic ‘rule’ but rather due to the index’s public 
acceptance as a ‘convention’ for measuring price change.  
The common view of the CPI as a measure of the ‘cost of living’ suggests that 
official change to the CPI ‘rules’ does not necessarily lead to change to the CPI as a 
‘convention’.  The changes to the composition of the CPI that stemmed from its 
use in monetary policy shows that the political role of the CPI as a ‘convention’ 
can, in turn, change the ‘rules’ of the CPI. The most significant recent change to 
the CPI, the removal of mortgage interest from its scope, has meant that that 
cumulative inflation, as measured by the CPI from 2009 to mid-2014 (in a time of 
low interest rates), was 11.2% rather than 7.1%, far higher than it otherwise would 
have been.16 
2.7 EMPIRCAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This research provides an examination of change in the measurement of inflation 
in New Zealand demonstrating how development of the CPI has been driven 
primarily by the machinations of politics rather than technological change. It 
analyses two significant periods of change in the design and usage of the CPI, 
demonstrating why the form of the index has been primarily the outcome of 
politics. It examines the economic and political power structures underlying the 
form and function of inflation measurement, and how change in those structures 
has precipitated change in the CPI. 
In addressing the story of change in how inflation is measured in New Zealand, I 
propose the following hypothesis: The measurement of inflation and the ‘cost of 
living’ is inherently political. Over time, New Zealand’s Consumers Price Index has 
been affected by change in economic and political power, both domestic and 
international.  The political functions that the CPI performs are determined by the 
outcome of political conflict which ultimately dictates the design and form of the 
statistic. As the power of institutions and political groupings increased and 
decreased, as did their influence over how price change was measured.  When the 
CPI was initially devised in the 1910s, the political and economic influence of the 
British Empire was prevalent over the Dominion of New Zealand, whereas later 
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developments in the CPI in the era surrounding World War II, power transmitted 
through international organisations such as the ILO and the United Nations had 
greater influence.   
As political and economic power among workers, employers and financiers 
changed, as did their influence on the CPI.  When the CPI had a direct impact on 
wage-setting through the Court of Arbitration, union and employer influence on 
the measurement of inflation was strong, whereas as the political strength of 
unions ebbed in the 1990s, and the financialisation of the New Zealand economy 
increased, changes to the index largely favoured the interests of finance over 
workers.   The consequential choices regarding the technological development of 
the CPI have always been inherently political, linked to the contemporary and 
historical political and economic power of institutions. 
The premise of this thesis is that politics changes technology, specifically that 
political struggle over time has changed how inflation is measured in New Zealand 
via the Consumers Price Index.  
To demonstrate this, two specific case studies will be presented from two distinct 
periods in the CPI’s 100-year history: Firstly, the transformation of the index from 
a prescriptive tool of social assessment that measured the ‘cost of living’ during 
World War I to an objective economic measure of inflation in the aftermath of 
World War II.  This will be followed by an examination of the circumstances 
surrounding the political decisions that led to the removal of the measurement of 
price change in mortgage interest payments from the index in 1999, the only major 
reduction in the scope of the index’s ‘basket of goods’ in its history. 
The choice of empirical research questions and these particular case studies is 
dictated in part by the constraints of the scope of the Master’s thesis programme 
and by the largely underdeveloped existing body of research into the political 
economy of price indexes both in New Zealand and elsewhere.  
To test this hypothesis this thesis will demonstrate the links between change in the 
function of the CPI with New Zealand’s position in the international economy and 
the structure of New Zealand’s domestic politics. I will explore the following 
research questions to demonstrate the power structures underlying the form and 
function of the Consumers Price Index and the causes of change in the 
measurement of inflation:   
1. Is change in New Zealand’s CPI driven primarily by technological 
improvement or is it primarily driven by politics? 
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2. Why did the basis of the CPI changed from a generally prescriptive measure 
of the ‘cost of living’ to a generally positivist measure of ‘inflation’? 
3. Why did the removal of mortgage interest from the CPI regimen in 1999 
occur? 
4. How has the process of change in the CPI occurred?  
In addressing these questions, this thesis will provide empirical evidence 
demonstrating the power structures underlying New Zealand’s economy and 
polity, and the overwhelming influence these structures have on the measurement 
of inflation its governance. In conducting this research, I must show awareness of 
evidence that is contrary of the tenets of the hypothesis that prove it inaccurate or 
incorrect. Where these instances arise, I will assess whether they undermine the 
linkages between the tenets underlying the argument of thesis. 
These questions seek to determine what political mechanisms, if any, have 
influenced the measurement of price change in New Zealand. These approach will 
examine whether the evolution of the Consumers Price Index is a case of 
technology influencing politics or instead has politics shaped technology?  Through 
the use of two distinct case studies this thesis examines the mechanisms that have 
influenced the form and function of the CPI has during its early years as well as its 
contemporary presence function. 
2.8 EMPRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite the significant redistributive consequence of the CPI to New Zealand’s 
economy and the continuous development of the statistic over the past century, 
until recently little attention has been paid to the intersection between politics and 
the epistemology of the index.  In part, this is due to the cross-cutting nature of the 
politics of economic statistics, reaching across the fields of economic, historical 
and political research.  
When cited in economic histories of New Zealand and elsewhere, the CPI and 
other related statistics tend to be treated as apolitical institutions that neutrally 
measure economic phenomena over time, with change occurring as part of an on-
going process of ‘technological improvement’ with little regard for the political 
environment surrounding that change. In political histories of labour movements 
and institutions in New Zealand, the discussion of the role of the CPI within the 
Court of Arbitration, for example, is often detached from the conflict between 
labour and capital that surrounded the role of the court itself. This study places the 
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history of change in the CPI within the contemporary political and social context it 
occurred within.  
Within the social sciences, the history of statistics is a common topic, for example 
there are numerous studies that examine the origins of social surveys particularly in 
the period spanning the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.1718 
Many of these works focus more on the organisation of and the political forces 
behind these surveys rather than the methodology of the data produced and 
collected.  But they do inform the study of the CPI as the origin of the statistic has 
direct links to an underlying purpose of identifying social need through 
information collection. Much of the findings of this research traces the transition 
from initiation by non-state actors towards social data being collected and 
controlled by the state, which parallels the early history of the CPI.  In a similar 
vein, studies of the history of censuses are also important, as the first governmental 
constructions of the CPI in New Zealand were conducted by the census office.19 
In New Zealand, there are several examinations of institutions that have been 
influential in the history of CPI change, many of which make reference to the role 
of the index. These include studies of the Court of Arbitration, the Department of 
Labour, the Treasury and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.20 21 22 Alongside these 
institutional studies are economic histories that coherently link the political 
environment to change in state and non-state institutions.23 
Internationally, there is a small but growing body of study into the politics of 
statistics.  Some studies that take a high level approach have formed general 
hypotheses regarding the use and construction of official statistics but are 
hamstrung from making detailed findings due to the lack of detailed domestic 
studies of individual statistics.24  But studies that focus on specific statistics at the 
national level are beginning to increase, in particular, examination of the American 
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CPI in a political context is becoming more developed.25  As more studies of the 
CPI (and other official statistics) at the national level become more prevalent, 
greater study of the role of official statistics and the macro and global level will be 
able to be undertaken.  This thesis will make a contribution to this body of 
knowledge. 
In New Zealand, the study of the history of the epistolomology of the CPI has 
until recently been largely unexamined. There are a smattering of descriptive 
studies regarding the history of statistics in New Zealand including a number of 
official works commissioned by Statistics New Zealand and an informal but 
informative, autobiography of the former Government Statistician, George 
Wood.26 There are also a number of technical and economic studies of the CPI, 
some which form part of the official reviews of the CPI conducted regularly by 
Statistics New Zealand. 
The CPI celebrated its 100 year anniversary as an official government statistic in 
July 2014. As part of the commemorations, Statistics New Zealand commissioned 
a special research project into the history of the statistic, of which a principal 
output was a volume of essays that looked at the role of the CPI from a number of 
different social, economic and technical viewpoints.27  This thesis is in part, a 
consequence of that project. This work utilises much of that primary research and 
secondary analysis. The author of this thesis, who was attached to the research 
project, acknowledges and thanks those that allowed me the opportunity to be part 
of that programme.  
2.9 A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST RESEARCH APPROACH 
Although this thesis will first and foremost address the substantive empirical 
questions raised above, it is also theoretically motivated and will contribute to 
debates relating to the theory of change in institutions.  
There is no universally accepted definition of an ‘institution’ in social sciences.  
However, as T.R. Voss argues, there are generally two perspectives of institutions – 
firstly, institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ – constraints upon human interaction 
that “involve mutually related rights and obligations” allowing the organisation of 
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society in a predictable manner.28  Secondly, institutions are the equilibrium or 
‘convention’ that results from adherence to these rules, creating expectations for 
‘normal’ conduct.  Essentially, institutions are both ‘rules’ and ‘conventions’ for 
human interaction that encapsulate expectations for human behaviour.  
Institutions, of course, do not have to be governed by formalised rules.  For 
example the performance of a karakia and the removal of footwear upon entering a 
marae is not governed by formal legislation but by social and cultural expectations 
that have developed over centuries.  This study of the CPI, however, is principally 
concerned with change in the formal ‘rules’ of institutions as they are related to 
social ‘conventions’, in particular political conflict and historical context.  
The differing approaches to the study of institutions have implications for the 
methodological approach to the study of CPI change.  Three broad perspectives 
are identified in much of the literature on ‘new institutionalisms’.  Although these 
categories are not exclusive and overlap to an extent, distinguishing between the 
approaches is important because of the difference in assumptions that underlie 
these perspectives.  
A broad evaluation of the approaches is provided by Hall and Taylor.29  The 
authors distinguish between two core issues that relate to institutions: the role of 
institutions in determining ‘social and political outcomes’ and the behaviour of 
actors and secondly, how institutions are created and the circumstances under 
which change occurs.  Although this study is primarily concerned with the second 
issue, there are strong links between both aspects.  
Hall and Taylor observe that despite some overlap between them, the three 
approaches are highly polarised, having developed somewhat ‘independently’ from 
each other which is reflected in the disciplines commonly associated with the 
approaches.  Broadly, rational choice institutionalism tends to be associated with 
economics, normative institutionalism with sociology and historical institutionalism 
with political science.  
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors operate with rational self-
interest and fixed preferences and behave so as to maximise the attainment of 
those preferences.  Under this perspective, institutions are voluntarily created by 
the mutual agreement of relevant actors to perform a function that will resolve a 
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collective action problem and ensure mutually beneficial gain.  Institutions are 
assumed to exist so long as the associated actors continue to benefit from them.  
Explanations of institutional change are linked to shifts in the pay-offs received by 
actors which may prompt them to reshape the institution to meet changing 
interests.  Rational choice, therefore, is a highly functionalist approach although it 
has been criticised as empirically insignificant and overly simplistic.30 
In contrast, normative institutionalism tends to entail little reference to rationality 
or functionalism.  This approach views institutions as ‘culturally-specific’ practices 
that are the ‘forms, procedures or symbols’ that embedded within organisations.  
This approach entails a definition of institutions that includes ‘symbol systems, 
cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the frames of meaning for 
guiding human interaction’, a scope wider than the formal rules, procedures and 
norms typically defined by the rational and historical approaches.  Institutions are 
seen to influence the behaviour of individuals through the internalisation of norms 
that are associated with particular roles.  In contrast to the rational approach the 
motivation for the creation and maintenance of an institution is to increase the 
‘social-legitimacy’ of associated actors rather than ‘efficiency’.  This approach can 
explain why particular institutions are maintained despite detracting from the goals 
and preferences of the associated actors.  On the other hand a weakness of this 
approach is the understatement of agency within actors.  The normative approach 
views agency as something that is conditioned by respective institutions.  
Therefore power-political conflicts within particular institutional arrangements 
tend to be overlooked under this approach.  
Historical institutionalism (HI), as the name suggests, depicts temporal processes 
and historical events as critical in shaping the institutions that inform preferences.  
Therefore actors behave according to the institutional rules that define their 
strategies and unlike the rationalist approach, HI recognises the historical presence 
and legacies of institutions.  
HI also entails broader assumptions on the effect of institutions on actor 
behaviour.  Asymmetries in power relations shape how institutions are created and 
developed.  Other variables, such as ideas and the complexities of institutional and 
individual behaviour tend to be integrated in this type of institutional analysis.   A 
common critique of this approach is the propensity to generalise rather than 
making coherent theoretical contributions. Furthermore, HI has tended to place a 
strong emphasis on path-dependence and reinforcing mechanisms which 
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contributes to a static view of institutions.  A strength of the HI approach is that it 
has been very strong in explaining continuity in institutions, but as some have 
argued, this has come at the expense of explaining change and transformation.  
Thus the three approaches hold broadly differing assumptions on the role of 
actors, the reasons for the formation of institutions, why they are maintained and 
why change or continuity occurs. But there is reasonable consensus (at least 
between HI and rational choice) that the mechanisms for institutional change and 
continuity are far from being well understood.   
Examining the development of the CPI through each of these competing schools 
of thought would be the ideal for the study of the CPI as an institution. But given 
the limitation of the scope of the Masters’ thesis, the longevity of the CPI and the 
paucity of pre-existing literature specifically devoted to the topic, it is preferable to 
narrow the focus to one approach.  The relevance of historical and institutional 
legacies makes HI the most relevant approach to the study of New Zealand’s 
Consumers Prices Index.  In addition the developing emphasis on the on the role 
of agents and the study of incremental change in the field of HI makes change in 
the CPI likely to provide the most informative contribution among the three main 
‘schools’ of thought in institutionalism.  
2.10 REVIEW OF LITERATURE REGARDING INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
The political economy of New Zealand’s CPI is an example of institutional change 
that can inform and further research into the study of the theory of institutions. 
Over its history the CPI has undergone change relatively frequently to maintain its 
political and economic relevance and forestall exhaustion.  The changing 
construction of New Zealand’s CPI also has clear international and domestic 
political influences.  On first glance, the CPI appears to undergo significant and 
sudden change in response to external exogenous shocks, such as globally driven 
price change that are linked to events such as wars and economic depressions.  But 
many of the changes to the CPI may be caused by incrementally introduced 
ambiguities in its form and function. The CPI as an institution is quixotic, it 
simultaneously has informal and formal uses, and the outcomes it produces often 
have high political salience.  Yet the debate over its construction and epistemology 
often resides in the domain of ‘quiet politics’ among vested interests and policy 
makers, even as it maintains ubiquity among the wider public as a measure that has 
consequential impact on economic redistribution.  
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The study of historical change in economic and political institutions is not new.  
There is a growing literature within the field of HI that attempts to explain the 
reasons for institutional change in economic institutions.  Broadly, there are two 
areas of thought on institutional change within the field of HI. There is an 
argument that institutions are often ‘locked into’ path dependence and significant 
institutional change occurs as a result of exogenous shocks.31  On the other hand 
change can be said to occur as a consequence of on-going incremental change. 
Both of these approaches are central to the literature on institutional change in 
developed economies.  
One of the most prominent and influential incremental perspectives is the work of 
Thelen that examined the development of the German apprenticeship system 
finding that although developed for one purpose the institution ultimately became 
something much different.  Thelen found that institutional change is not 
necessarily caused by disruption but can occur incrementally and changes that may 
appear minor cumulatively recast institutions with significant consequences for 
economies and society.32  
Baumgartner and Jones argue that that the model of punctuated equilibrium shows 
that institutions remain stable over time but can change by a sudden societal or 
governmental shift.33 Punctuated change, which is often linked to the analysis of 
‘critical junctures’ suggests that institutions are inherently stable and sticky, 
bounded by the rationality of interest groups and policymakers, with change largely 
prompted by a shock to the prevailing system.   
The critical juncture framework views institutional change as being rooted in prior 
crises and cleavages with its cause linked to a weakness in the status quo. 34  An 
exogenous shock occurs which necessitates change for its resolution. Critical 
junctures are changes that resolve problems and set in place that inaugurate the 
new ‘normal’.  A punctuated change occurs because it serves a need or for change 
to a system instigated by a crisis.  This approach is broadly functionalist; the 
punctuated change of a critical juncture addresses problems related to prior 
political decisions and events.  The prevailing order cannot sustain itself and thus 
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must shed the old, to reveal a new skin. Elements that echo this argument have 
also crossed over into popular culture with the idea of ‘disruptive’ change that is 
especially popular in technological circles in North America such as ‘Silicon 
Valley’.35 
The incrementalist argument is an actor-centred theory that argues that institutions 
undergo continuous but gradual change over time.  There are on-going struggles 
and choices made among opportunistic actors that attempt to alter the institution 
or maintain the status quo which can result in significant and consequential change 
to institutions. This argument, put most forcefully by Mahoney and Thelen argues 
that institutional change commonly occurs due to ambiguities in rule interpretation 
and enforcement when allows space for actors to implement existing rules in new 
ways.36 Thus institutional change and outcomes do not necessarily reflect the aims 
of any particular group of actors, they instead may be the unintended consequence 
of conflict between groups or compromises among actors who coordinate on 
institutional construction despite differing on substantive goals. Perceived stability 
institutional stability not only relies upon accumulation and mobilisation of power 
and resources, as does change. Therefore shifts in the balance of power between 
actors over time can result in institutional change. 
This intent of this thesis is to address the theoretical puzzle of institutional change 
in the CPI from both the incrementalist and path dependence-punctuated change 
perspectives.  The Mahoney and Thelen framework that links the characteristics of 
the institution and the political context with the type of dominant change agents 
and the resulting type of institutional change will be tested against the case studies 
of change in the CPI and the alternative explanation of punctuated change.   
While it is acknowledged that two approaches to change are not necessarily 
opposed, and are in some ways complementary,37  there are shortcomings in the 
two approaches.  For example, under the punctuated change theory, the definition 
is often fuzzy as to when change is said to be major and the threshold above which 
defines a sudden change. On the incrementalist side, it is often unclear what 
change is considered to be incremental rather than sudden. It is at times unclear 
what a major change is defined as because what could be the result of the 
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accumulation of small changes may over time, combine to reach a tipping point 
that appears to produce  ‘sudden’ change.  
An approach from the incrementalist perspective, articulated by Thelen and 
Mahoney, has the potential to overcome the shortcoming of these definitional 
issues that may suit the study of change in statistical institutions such as the CPI.  
This model for gradual transformative change encompasses five broadly defined 
modes of change: ‘layering’, ‘conversion’, ‘drift’, ‘displacement’ and ‘exhaustion’. 
These types of change are linked to the on-going discretion of institutional rule 
interpretation and enforcement as well as the relative strength of political actors.38 
These approaches are all based around incremental endogenous shifts in power 
and thinking over long periods of time. 
Displacement of an institution tends to emanate from a shift in power where the 
prevalent power is undermined in favour of a new paradigm. This may occur as a 
consequence of new actors creating or reactivating new systems or approaches 
towards an institution. Exhaustion as a process often leads to the breakdown of an 
institution rather than change, although this is gradual rather than abrupt. Over 
time institutions may become unaware of the changing political and economic 
context and are unprepared for the future. Drift can result from ambiguities in 
processes that cause actors to alter their previous duties or responsibilities. Drift 
need not only occur through political actions but also through subtle changes in 
the political context and environment.   
Layering is defined as to be when forms, functions, rules and outcomes are added 
upon an existing institution that has previously appeared to be intractable to 
change. New functions are introduced alongside immoveable old ones, and 
although the new processes were not originally intended to supplant the old, the 
effect creates a new dynamic among actors that ultimately leads to significant 
institutional change. Layering appears to fill the void between the intentions and 
outcomes of institutions by arguing that existing institutions are not replaced 
wholesale, but that new ‘layers’, such as that change outcomes incrementally over 
time. 
Conversion is where an institution is redirected to new functions or purposes. This 
redirection can be a result of changes in political dynamics and context. This is 
different from layering in that it is the institution rather than the actors that adapts 
to the new political context. The redirection of purpose may in turn create further 
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political struggle in what the function of the institution should be. This can lead to 
compromise among actors and interest to mitigate ambiguities in the enforcement 
and interpretation of rules.  
Given the multiple roles of the CPI over time, both formal and informal, in the 
indexation of incomes, as an economic and social indicator, and a monetary policy 
tool, the ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’ approaches appear to be useful devices for 
examining incremental change in the CPI as an institution. This thesis will 
primarily test these incrementalist approaches against the case studies of change in 
the CPI, while acknowledging that other alternatives such as drift and displacement 
may also serve as more useful theoretical explanations.  Although the primary 
theoretical examination of these case studies regards incremental change, the 
‘sudden’ change models of path dependence and punctuated equilibrium will also 
be evaluated as a contrast.  
In addition, it must be acknowledged that there are many areas of institutional 
study that this thesis will not address including the preference formation of interest 
groups and actors as well as other perspectives and explanations for institutional 
change within HI and other schools of institutionalism.  
2.11 THEORETICAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The theoretical questions this thesis will address are as follows:  
1) Are these significant changes in the CPI examples of sudden or incremental 
change? 
2) Does ‘path dependence’ or ‘layering and conversion’ adequately explain the 
process of institutional change in the CPI? 
Not only will this thesis contribute to the existing body of work on the political 
economy of official statistics, it will also broaden and add to the study of 
institutional change theory.  
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CHAPTER 3 – INCEPTION AND ENTRENCHEMENT: THE CPI AND 
NEW ZEALAND’S POLTICAL ECONOMY 1891 – 1949 
3.1 SUMMARY  
This chapter will identify and evaluate the processes and sources of political change 
to the CPI in the first half of the 20th Century.  It will examine the circumstances 
that surrounded the creation of the index in the 1910s, its consolidation and 
transformation into a consequential distributive tool, and the subsequent 
formalisation into an official statistic of the state in the post-WWII era.  
Explanations as to why the CPI, which began as a subjective social tool of 
examination in 1910s ultimately became an objective mechanism of economic 
redistribution will be proffered with a focus on changing political environment and 
balance of power among interest groups, actors and institutions.  This case study is 
evaluated against explanations of institutional change that assess how change in the 
index occurred and how the outcome of change related to the process of change.  
The chapter concludes by assessing whether this episode of institutional change 
was primarily caused by the ‘shock’ of exogenous events or whether it was the 
consequence of incremental change generated endogenously through constant 
struggle between interests, ideas and institutions.  
3.2 THE ‘SIGNIFICANT CHANGE’ 
Following the conclusion of World War II, a government-appointed committee 
tasked with devising a revised ‘cost of living’ measure for the post-war era, 
proposed significant changes to the New Zealand’s official price index, which was 
renamed to the ‘Consumers Price Index’.  What had been a prescriptive statistic of 
social investigation that measured price change in what households should consume 
became a positivist economic statistic that measured the price change of the goods 
and services that households actually consume.  This change was generally 
supported by most of the dominant actors that ultimately determined the structure 
of the CPI including the Court of Arbitration, the Government Statistician, 
employer groups and unions as well as international bodies and of course the 
Cabinet of the New Zealand Government.   
The process of technological change through political struggle began soon after the 
CPI was first conceived in the 1910s and intensified as the political and economic 
consequences of the statistic increased leading to significant change as the balance 
of power shifted among influential actors. 
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3.3 THE EARLY YEARS OF CPI DEVELOPMENT 
Social statistics underwent rapid development in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere during the nineteenth century as important new methods for gathering 
information about the population. Although the idea of counting and categorising 
information relating to the conditions of life was not in itself a new idea as 
demographic studies, for example, were developed during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the nineteenth century saw what were once intermittent 
attempts to assess social ills in the United Kingdom organised into systematic 
measures of society that were used to inform government policy. This was based 
on the belief that numerical facts provided a rational basis to identify social trends.  
For example, the collection of a British census commenced in 1801 and by the 
1830s statistical societies began to form. Often in co-ordination with the British 
government, such societies provided information to parliamentary committees. 
Large-scale statistical work was also undertaken, such as the royal commissions 
into the Poor Laws and the condition of the Irish poor, and within the factory 
inspection system. Government departments then began to set up their own 
statistical sections, such as in the Home Office and the Board of Trade, and a 
General Register Office was established to centrally collate information on births, 
deaths and marriages.  
Soon after the British assumed governance of the colonies of New Zealand in 
1840, the systematic collection of prices began.  ‘Blue Books’ of essential data 
regarding the new colonies were composed and sent back to the Home Office in 
the United Kingdom annually from the 1850s onwards. As New Zealand became 
more integrated and reliant upon the Imperial economy, it experienced the cyclical 
effects of the global economic system. Through the ‘Long Depression’ of the 
1880s New Zealand suffered high levels of unemployment spurring large-scale 
emigration to Australia.  Although often disorganised, sporadic and shirt in 
duration, the frequency of strike action and industrial unrest increased and trade 
unions began to form and attempt to gain legal recognition.  This coincided with 
growing elite and public concern around social unrest and the standard of living 
for New Zealanders.  
3.4 ASSESSING SOCIAL ILLS IN ‘BETTER BRITAIN’ 
The impetus for statistical assessment of social ills began in earnest in the 1890s 
with the election of the Liberal government.  Although seeing themselves as 
‘British’, many politicians within New Zealand’s first party-based government saw 
themselves as pioneers intent in establishing a ‘new world’ free from ‘old world’ 
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‘evils’ such as landed monopolies. A series of radical social and economic reforms 
were introduced including women’s suffrage, expansion of worker’s rights through 
a court of arbitration and the establishment of a national pension system. While 
the intent of these policies was in part designed to stem the exodus to Australia 
and protect workers’ standards of living, decades later, these reforms would all 
have implications on the direction of the CPI. 
Even though many of the reforms of the Liberal government were world-leading, 
they were greatly motivated by trends from the United Kingdom and elsewhere.  
For example, the idea of ‘an industrial army of labour’ was derived from the 
fledging British Fabian movement which was a significant influence on many New 
Zealand political elites in the 1890s.  Yet while working and social conditions were 
not of a high standard for many New Zealanders at the time, the social ills in the 
largely agricultural colony differed in many respects from the industrialised ‘old 
world’.  
This tendency among elites to replicate contemporary British concerns in colonial 
New Zealand society explains the establishment and approach of a Royal 
Commission in 1890 that investigated the problems of ‘sweating’ (exploitation of 
workers via long wages and long hours).  Despite a largely rural economy with 
small-scale industries and few large factories, “it was the fear of what might 
happen, rather than the reality, which motivated policy”.39 This commission 
borrowed many of the techniques and approaches of social investigation that had 
been developed in the United Kingdom throughout the century. But the 
underdeveloped nature of the New Zealand state allowed elite politicians and 
officials are freer hand in the design of organisations through which they hoped to 
create a ‘better Britain’.  
3.5 THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR DEPARTMENT  
The principal outcome of the ‘rational’ studies of the Sweating Commission was 
the creation of a department of labour to oversee the labour market and reduce 
unemployment. The Commission also proposed the creation of a dedicated 
statistical department similar to those already established in Australian states to 
assess living and working conditions through scientific methods, although this 
recommendation was not taken up.40  The new labour department did however, 
incorporate some data gathering roles akin to the British Board of Trade.  Liberal 
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leader John Ballance claimed the department would be a “special office for the 
collection of all information connected to industry, in the nature of a Bureau 
d’Industrie, which has been established in many European countries and found to 
work well” although this did not eventuate.41  During the 1890s, the raft of 
employment legislation enacted such as compulsory arbitration and ‘anti-sweating’ 
regulations required considerable administration and enforcement that consumed 
much of the new labour department’s resources which relegated data collection to 
a secondary priority. This pushed the department to favour the haphazard 
methodology of voluntary collection and submission of data rather than sampling 
households, workplaces and merchants in a systemic manner. 
Despite the lower priority ascribed to data collection, the department undertook a 
number of studies that influenced the early form of the CPI.  The first hints at the 
conceptual basis of what would become the CPI can be seen in the family budget 
study conducted by the Department of Labour in 1893.42  ‘Returns of Expenditure 
by Working-Men’, although crude by modern standards was a study of comparable 
quality to contemporary studies conducted by social scientists in the United States 
and Europe.  This is because the study, right down to its methodology and choice 
of commodity prices measured was a duplicate of an 1889 investigation conducted 
by the UK Board of Trade.43   Aside from a more conservative treatment of 
alcohol (New Zealand only measured alcohol consumed in the home) and an 
arbitrary division of families based on incomes below or above 100 pounds, very 
little in the study was customised for New Zealand conditions.  This ‘copy-and-
paste’ of methodology meant the underlying conceptual principles behind the 
British initiative were transferred unchanged into the measurement of New 
Zealand economic conditions.    While the content of what was measured in the 
budget studies was not entirely suitable for New Zealand, (for example New 
Zealanders caught and grew their own food at a far higher proportion than the 
British) it did mean that fledgling colony was able to quickly implement relatively 
modern research techniques in the field.   
Acknowledgement of the importance of the urban working class in the functioning 
of the economy were the basis of many European and American budget studies in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Thus as the British Board of Trade study 
was based on an 1853 International Statistics Institute resolution stating that “in 
every country means should be devised to lay the foundations of domestic 
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economy among the working classes” so too was New Zealand’s budget 
study.44  The focus on a ‘working class’ standard of living was compatible with the 
raison d’être of the Department of Labour and this preoccupation carried over into 
the nascent development of a national price index. 
In 1903 a survey of merchants and landlords was carried out in order to estimate 
the price change of ‘necessaries’ over the previous ten years.  Percentage price 
changes for individual items and rental types were provided that ranged from no 
change in the price of tobacco, a 25 per cent increase in rental housing to a 50 per 
cent increase in the price of firewood.45  Matching the subjective and arguably 
paternalistic trend of social surveys of the time, these surveys set the tone for ‘cost 
of living’ studies in New Zealand.  These two studies also demonstrated the 
ambition of the state to establish the costs for a working family to meet its basic 
needs in order to determine the necessary level of wages. 
As the labour laws of the 1890s gradually became normalised and unemployment 
reduced in the early 1900s, the labour department looked to expand its statistical 
and information gathering role.46 But without the powers of compulsion enjoyed 
by their overseas counterparts, the department faced continued problems in 
collecting data from employers and merchants so as to report upon social 
conditions.  Many employers viewed the department with suspicion feeling it was 
biased towards the side of workers which hindered its statistical gathering capacity. 
Despite urgings from unions and the head of the department to grant greater 
power, when the department’s legislation was amended in 1905, only limited scope 
was granted to the office to compel the collection of data.47  Unlike in other 
countries such as the United States where the Bureau of Labour Statistics led the 
development of the US CPI, the curtailing of the statistical powers of the New 
Zealand labour department ultimately meant it would not lead the construction of 
the New Zealand CPI.  
3.6 THE FIRST PRICE INDEX 
With the problem of unemployment receding and the prices of commodities 
increasing the ‘cost of living’ began to become a contentious political issue in the 
first decade of the 20th Century.  Unions were critical of wage award decisions 
handed down by the new Court of Arbitration feeling they had not kept pace with 
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changes in the cost of living.48  In response the Minister of Internal Affairs 
commissioned the Registrar-General (who at the time had responsibility for official 
statistics) to create a price index of ‘basic items’ to compare with wage awards over 
the past decade so as to assess the validity of the unions’ claims.  At a series of 
public meetings in 1908 regarding the Labour and the Arbitration Act, the Minister 
cited these index figures to claim that awards by the Court of Arbitration had kept 
pace with the increased cost of living and nor were the Court’s decisions 
responsible for price change.49  The index was extremely crude containing just nine 
food items with prices collected by police as part of the 1906 census.50  But the 
citation of an ‘index’ to justify government policy indicates some level of familiarity 
among the public and elites with the concept.  For example, price indexes had been 
mentioned for some time in local newspaper articles regarding local and 
international research into price change.51 
3.7 STUDYING THE ‘COST OF LIVING’ 
Perhaps the most significant event for the early development of New Zealand’s 
national price index occurred in another country. With the states and territories of 
Australia becoming a federation in 1901, a federal statistics agency was established 
in 1905 to co-ordinate the activities of the pre-existing state statistical agencies. 
Although it would be 50 years until the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics would entirely assimilate the state agencies, the creation of a central office 
was critical for efforts at standardising statistical methods across both Australia and 
New Zealand. Prior to its creation, the individual states of Australia had compiled 
and published statistics for their own use and a series of conferences with 
representations from state agencies (including New Zealand’s Registrar General) 
were used to co-ordinate efforts.  The new federal agency took over the 
conference co-ordinating role and used its powers to forward several initiatives 
under the stewardship of renowned Commonwealth Statistician George 
Knibbs.  Among the early initiatives were an investigation into the cost of living 
and the development of a retail price index.  The frequency of state policy transfer 
between Australia and New Zealand due to their shared colonial histories, close 
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professional and social links and similarity of the two societies meant it was not 
long until the statistical investigations were replicated across the Tasman.52 
Although attempts to strengthen the statistical capacity of the Department of 
Labour were stymied in the early 1900s, in 1911 the department embarked on an 
investigation into the ‘cost of living’ problem so as to “present the public reliable 
data as to the cost of living”.53  The methodology of the study was influenced by a 
similar Australian cost of living investigation that commenced in mid-
1910.  Department of Labour officials were dispatched to Australia to learn from 
Knibbs and his office which supplied complete information on the methodology 
and techniques being employed in the survey.  While the New Zealand inquiry 
appeared highly derivative of the Australian version, even down to the layout and 
formatting of the published report, there were some significant differences. 
While the Australia study did not set limits to the level or sources of income of the 
surveyed households, the New Zealand survey narrowed the concept of ‘living’ to 
that of a nuclear family, with income neither too high nor too low, that paid rent 
and was supported by a father in stable employment. The response rate for this 
budget survey of households of “bona fide workers” was poor with just 69 of 1800 
account-books being of “any practical use” for the study.  But this was judged in 
some respects to improve the worth of the survey as it identified the workers 
deserving of most interest. As the report stated: “The figures certainly show that 
the data supplied has come almost exclusively from those workers who are thrifty 
and careful, and on this account they may therefore be considered of special 
interest, as the community generally is mainly concerned in ‘the struggle for 
existence’ by those who practise economy in household and general expenditure.”54 
This was the political framing behind measuring the cost of living in the 1910s: to 
assess the lifestyles of the more ‘virtuous’ sections of the working class, rendering 
normative judgements into a ‘scientific’ model which would frame the public 
policy debate. 
Despite its limited data set, normative framing and limited success in achieving its 
stated aim, the data gathered by the study was of assistance in determining 
weightings for early price indexes and was of considerable use for the Royal 
Commission on the Cost of Living of 1912, perhaps the zenith of New Zealand 
cost of living investigations in the pre-WWII era. 
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3.8 THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE COST OF LIVING 
In the dying days of the Liberal administration a Royal Commission was convened 
to investigate causes of the rising cost of living and to make recommendations on 
how to resolve the problem.  The scope of the commission was wide but their 
capacity for gathering historical data was limited to conducting interviews and the 
use of existing data sets.  Aside from price lists and household accounts supplied 
by witnesses the only contemporary data available to the Commission was the 1912 
Department of Labour study and a recently published doctoral thesis measuring 
historical wholesale price change. The first task of the commission was to define 
the ‘cost of living’, for this they cited standards defined in The Economics of Industry 
by prominent British economist Alfred Marshall.  This was defined as “the sum of 
money that represents the efforts and sacrifices necessary to obtain the goods for 
securing and maintaining a certain amount of existence and efficiency.”  The 
Commission asserted that “Marshall’s statement for England may be accepted with 
slight modifications for New Zealand”.55 
With its limited data the Commission was able to establish that there had been a 
“tentative and only roughly approximate” sixteen percent increase over a fifteen 
year period coupled with a rise of 24 percent in wages over the same period.56  In 
attempting to determine causes, the Commission examined whether the increased 
costs had led to a higher standard of living using a variety of metrics including 
comparing household food expenditure in New Zealand to that in the United 
States and Europe with inconclusive results. The Commission also incited 
controversy by looking into possible price fixing, collusion and underweighted 
goods being supplied by retailers. Citing the orthodoxy among neoclassical 
economists of the time the principal problem was defined to be “the increasing 
supply of money, including gold and credit, and the increasing velocity of 
circulation”.57 The Commission noted widespread problems with merchant 
practices and monopolies and came down strongly against high tariffs supporting a 
policy of ‘free trade’. The report also advocated New Zealand taking up 
representation on the proposed International Commission on the Cost of Living, 
which at the time was the pet project of prominent economist Irving Fisher.58 
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The Royal Commission was strongly attacked by both merchants and populists 
with one newspaper describing its ‘free trade’ proposals as “an excellent thing for a 
small tribe of hook-nosed usurers”.59  On its presentation to Parliament the report 
languished with little discussion of its contents.  This was not only due to its 
controversial nature but also because the Liberal Government had been deposed 
since the Commission’s formation and the new Prime Minister had little interest in 
advancing a political cause of his predecessor.  Internationally, the report was 
praised for its robustness and for a short time New Zealand was seen as among 
world leaders in cost of living studies. John M. Keynes reviewed the report in The 
Economic Journal taking particular interest in the Commission’s link “between 
education and the cost of living” in its proposal for greater education of economic 
fact and theory in schools.60  One American reviewer labelled the report “far 
superior to anything that has appeared in the subject thus far in the United 
States.”61 
The enduring legacy of the Royal Commission was its recommendation for a more 
robust system of national statistics concluding that “the first essential in the study 
of any social problem is correct diagnosis of the case”.62  The list of 
recommendations included the creation of a department headed by a Government 
Statistician with full control and authority to collect and publish all state statistics. 
The Statistician would be sent abroad to locations such as the United States to 
study the most modern methodologies.  An advisory board would be appointed 
comprised of representatives of different domestic interests to direct the course of 
statistical development.  Yet it would not be until the post-WWII era that New 
Zealand statistics would resemble the vision of the Royal Commission and it was 
even later in 1975 that the Government Statistician would be given full 
independence and ultimate control over statistical methodology.  But the Royal 
Commission did set a course that meant it would be the Government Statistician, 
rather than other government officials that would spearhead the development of 
New Zealand’s national price index. Despite the lead role of the Government 
Statistician, as this thesis will show in a later chapter, even with enshrined 
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‘apolitical’ independence established in law and expertise, the structure of the Price 
Index was still susceptible to political influence throughout its history.  
3.9 THE GOVERNMENT STATISTICIAN 
The creation of the position of Government Statistician in late 1910 was entirely 
the result of international influence. The British Empire had long attempted to co-
ordinate an Imperial Census and in preparation for the 1911 census significant 
pressure was exerted across the colonies to standardise methods.63 New Zealand 
was instructed to create a dedicated government bureaucrat to administer the 
census and other statistics akin to the Australian model.  This was reflected in 
parliamentary debate about the position with the rationale more about duty and 
fealty to the Empire rather than direct benefit to New Zealand.64 
While the powers granted in the 1910 legislation largely surrounded the conduct of 
the Census there were provisions included that directed the Government 
Statistician to collect statistics on a number of other topics including “Vital, social, 
and industrial matters”.65  Although his powers steadily expanded, the Government 
Statistician did not have exclusive authority over statistics and often worked 
alongside other government departments and agencies. Aside from census 
directives the tasks of the Government Statistician were vaguely defined leaving a 
deal of interpretation to both the Minister and the official.  As the focal point of 
statistical development in New Zealand, the predilections of the Government 
Statistician greatly affected the direction and focus of the CPI and official statistics 
particularly in their formative stages.   Malcolm Fraser was appointed in early 1911 
after the first appointee departed a few months into the job.  Fraser was not a 
trained statistician, renowned more as a manager and administrator willing to take 
on and promote the ideas of others.66 While he was ably supported by skilled 
statisticians such as John Condliffe and Douglas Copland, it was Fraser’s 
worldview that would shape the initial form of New Zealand’s national price index. 
As an indication of the wide scope of actions available to the Government 
Statisician, one of the first initiatives taken by his Office was the publication of 
J.W. Mcilraith’s doctoral thesis.  This significant work examined the course of 
                                                          
63
 A.J. Christopher, 2008, ‘The quest for a census of the British Empire c.1840 – 1940’, Journal of Historical 
Geography, Vol. 34, p.280 
64
 Census and Statistics Act: First Reading, November 21 1910, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
vol. 153, p. 861 
65
 Census and Statistics Act 1910, s21(b) 
66
 George Wood, 1977, Progress in Official Statistics: 1840-1957: A Personal History, Wellington, Government 
Printer, p. 15 
46 
 
wholesale prices in New Zealand from 1860 to 1910 applying contemporary price 
index theory to historical data.  Considering that McIlraith had little government 
support for his project the results were highly informative, forming the core of the 
historical price data used by the Royal Commission on the Cost of 
Living.  Mcilraith had plans to continue his time-series, seeking to publish a set of 
annual price index figures in the official New Zealand Year Book.  But this 
advance, (made before the Cost of Living Commission issued its report) was 
rebuffed by the Minister of Internal Affairs who felt that such statistics still 
remained under the purview of the Department of Labour.67   
3.10 THE BIRTH OF THE CPI 
Following the tabling of the Royal Commission report the Government Statistician 
was given authorisation to visit Australia to study the methods employed in the 
state and Commonwealth Statistics offices. Fraser returned to New Zealand in 
June 1913 and reported his findings to the Minister of Internal Affairs, having high 
praise for the place of statistics in political and economic decision making as well 
as the practical methods of tabulation and collection.  The Government Statistician 
found State and Commonwealth officials to be very supportive in advising on the 
development of New Zealand statistics and Fraser urged his government to 
improve local statistics by adopting Australian methods.68 Particularly intrigued 
with the Commonwealth Statistician’s investigation of industrial and economic 
circumstances including retail prices and the cost of living, Fraser recommended to 
parliament that his office (assisted by the Department of Labour) be given 
authorisation and resources to undertake industrial and economic inquiries “on 
similar lines to those instituted by the Commonwealth Statistician”.69  With the 
request granted Fraser set about his inquiry in earnest in early 1914. 
The purpose of the investigation was two-fold, to establish a system for the regular 
collection of commodity prices for a regularly published index and also to establish 
the course of price change since the commencement of the social and economic 
reforms in the 1890s. For these tasks the Government Statistician relied heavily on 
the expertise of the Australian Commonwealth and State statisticians.  Fraser had 
been previously been supplied by Knibbs with much of the explanatory literature 
and material used in creating the Australian index.  As work on the project 
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progressed Fraser regularly communicated with Australian statisticians updating 
them on his progress and soliciting advice on specific technical issues.70  
The onset of the Great War hampered the development of the index initially as 
government resources were redirected towards the war effort.  But as the 
economic effects of the war became apparent with prices increasing for many 
imported goods, the perceived need for the development of a retail price index 
became even more pressing. Fraser thus integrated a third task into the study, 
establishing the effects of wartime on the cost of living.  After many delays, the 
first results of the Cost of Living inquiry were published in mid-1915 with a more 
through report published at end of that year.  Although Fraser had planned to 
investigate wholesale and import/export prices these investigations were dropped 
because of the pressures of war and the greater need for cost of living data for 
what was named the Retail Price Index (RPI).  The methodology used to calculate 
the index was drawn from Australia with Fraser using Knibbs’ Laspeyres-based 
‘aggregate-expenditure’ method. Weightings were largely based upon the 1910 
Department of Labour cost of living survey.  There were two principal reasons for 
adopting the Australian methodology; Fraser was convinced that Knibbs’s method 
was the “best and most accurate” measure of price change while also being simple 
to calculate, citing contemporary international research on price indexes to support 
his claim. 71   Secondly, Fraser believed that great use could be made of the 
‘comparative experience’ of the two dominions, writing in a letter to Knibbs that 
“I sincerely hope that the methods and work of the two offices will come more 
and more into line in future, and I would like to do all in my power to forward 
uniformity”.72 
The choice of commodities to measure price change in was derived from the 
Australian index; thus the RPI had four groups in its regimen: groceries, dairy 
produce, meat and house rent.  This meant the New Zealand index excluded 
clothing, as it was argued that the role of clothing as a luxury item meant it was 
volatile to price change due to fashion trends and therefore unsuitable for 
measuring change in the cost of living. Fraser, like Knibbs, also incorporated an 
examination of the differing rates of price change in major towns and cities and 
assessed relative ‘purchasing power’.  While the RPI was incomplete as a measure 
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of consumer price change, the creation of a systemic method of collection and 
collation of price change was important for the integration of price indexes into 
economic and political decision-making.  Aside from a period during WWII, a 
price index of retail commodities has been regularly published in New Zealand 
since 1915.  
Concurrent with the publication of the RPI the powers of the Government 
Statistician were strengthened which gave Fraser greater scope to develop New 
Zealand’s statistical framework. But the activities of war, where Fraser had 
responsibilities for conscription meant little development occurred beyond the 
establishment of the basic RPI.  While Australia was the most important 
international influence upon on the form of New Zealand’s RPI and official 
statistics at this time, shortly after the war there was an attempt to impose 
uniformity of statistical methods across the British Empire.  Stemming from the 
efforts to standardise census-taking there had been discussions on increasing the 
compatibility of official statistics across the Empire to improve commerce and 
trade.  At the Imperial Conference of 1917 it was resolved that a Statistical 
Conference of Empire Statisticians would be held in 1920 to attempt to co-
ordinate methods.  The conference was based upon the contemporary model of 
Australian statistical conferences that co-ordinated State and Commonwealth 
statistical efforts. The conference had two broad purposes: the establishment of an 
imperial statistics office that would supervise statistics across the Empire and to 
enhance statistical techniques throughout the Empire through the exchange of 
ideas.73 
On Fraser’s journey to the British-based Conference the Government Statistician 
took the opportunity to observe processes within statistical offices in Australia, 
South Africa, Canada, the United States as well as the United Kingdom.  Fraser 
was impressed with the technology used in the offices and noted that the process 
of statistical centralisation which had just begun in New Zealand was well 
underway overseas.  In his report on these visits Fraser urged his government to 
make greater use of technology and hasten the centralisation process, although 
neither recommendation was ultimately followed to the extent that Fraser wished.74 
                                                          
73
 Jean-Pierre Beaud and Jean-Guy Prévost, 2005, ‘Statistics as the Science of Government: The Stillborn British 
Empire Statistical Bureau, 1918–20’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 33, No. 3, 
September 2005, pp. 371-372 
74
 Malcolm Fraser, 1920, ‘Report of Government Statistician on British Empire Statistical Conference’, AJHR, 
1920, H-12, pp. 1-2 
49 
 
At the Conference Fraser found himself aligned with statisticians from other 
Dominions against British officials who were perceived to be attempting to 
dominate proceedings.  Dominion Statisticians felt that the British attitude towards 
them was overly paternalistic possibly reflecting the maturing independence of the 
young nations and the similarity of their own statistical development.75  After 
negotiations that were occasionally fractious, the mandate and charter of an 
Empire Statistical Bureau that would act as a “clearing house” for statistics was 
agreed upon.  The planned Bureau would operate as an Empire representative in 
dealings with the newly created International Labour Organisation (ILO) which 
included statistics as part of its mandate.76 
Many resolutions on the structure of price indexes were agreed upon, these 
included adopting the aggregate-expenditure method (as used in Australia and New 
Zealand at the time), open disclosure of methodology and prices, regular revisions 
and monthly publication of a retail index of ‘staple commodities’.  Although on his 
return Fraser attempted to set about standardising the index and other statistics to 
Empire specifications, over time the resolutions had little long-term effect on the 
structure of New Zealand’s RPI.  For example, in 1930 New Zealand disregarded 
Imperial recommendations by using a method other than ‘aggregate-expenditure’ 
for the calculation of groups and sub-groups of items within the RPI. 
The New Zealand government was instrumental in stymieing the grand plans for 
the Empire Statistics Bureau.  While Fraser argued strongly in favour of the 
creation of the Bureau, the estimated annual cost to New Zealand of 1000 pounds 
(of an estimated £30,000 total) was seen as excessive for the government of the 
day given economic conditions.  New Zealand’s decision to opt out prompted the 
Australian government to express its hesitation at the plan which ultimately 
torpedoed the idea.77  During the 1920s efforts at Empire standardisation 
continued but soon fell away during the Great Depression and by the time of the 
next Empire Statistics Conference in 1935, the idea had quietly disappeared from 
the agenda.78  After WWII Empire conferences continued in the form of meetings 
of Commonwealth Statisticians in which New Zealand actively participated.  But 
the relevance of the Commonwealth in determining the form of the CPI and 
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official statistics in New Zealand was consultative, developmental and informative 
rather than a standard setting role. 
From its early development until the 1920s, New Zealand was largely passive in 
determining the underlying rationale and methodology of its national price index.  
Ideas ‘copied and pasted’ from the British Empire strongly influenced the design 
of the institutions such as the Statistics Office and the Department of Labour that 
developed the New Zealand’s first price index. But practical and direct contact 
with Australian statistical authorities often superseded Imperial influence.  
Methods for measuring price change were largely lifted from Australian institutions 
who themselves had borrowed (and in some cases improved upon) methodologies 
from Europe, the UK and the United States. There were some important political 
differences in New Zealand’s measurement of the ‘cost of living’ compared to 
elsewhere, particularly around the idea of the ‘worthy poor’. But as the price index 
began to take on greater political and economic importance in the inter-war period, 
it gradually morphed from being a tool of social discovery to being a 
macroeconomic tool of redistribution. Thus the index became a site of political 
struggle as powerful domestic interests and institutions began to assert greater 
influence on the composition of the statistic.   
3.11 THE COURT OF ARBITRATION 
The index took on greater importance in economic management through the inter-
war period principally through its use by the Court of Arbitration to determine 
wage rates.  The primacy of the index in determining wages meant the needs of the 
Court and the interests of employers and unions took on greater precedence in the 
composition of the index.  While New Zealand did not spurn efforts at global 
standardisation during this period, it was not a ‘fast follower’ and on occasion 
international requirements disguised changes to the index that were driven by 
domestic concerns.  Further development of the RPI was largely curtailed by the 
Great Depression although price controls and the renewal of Arbitration Court 
powers enacted by the 1935 Labour Government refocused attention on statistics 
to evaluate policy outcomes.  The constraints of the Second World War 
necessitated a remodelling of the index which became tightly integrated into 
wartime economic stabilisation policies.   
The Court of Arbitration was created as part of the labour reforms of the 1890s as 
a mechanism to resolve employment disputes and avoid the ‘labour problems’ of 
the ‘old world’. But over time the Court evolved into being a wage setting device 
for much of New Zealand’s workforce and it soon integrated ‘Cost of Living’ 
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adjustments into its judgements. Since its inception the Court had followed ‘fair 
wage’ principles, determining wage rates based on what was being paid by 
reputable employers and applying this to employers generally.79  But gradually its 
determinations came to incorporate the idea of a ‘living wage’ based on the idea of 
maintenance of a certain standard of living for workers.  This system of 
compulsory arbitration was unique to Australasia, so it was unsurprising that the 
New Zealand court would look towards Australia for direction and influence in its 
judgments.  The concept of a ‘living wage’ first appeared in the 1907 Harvester 
judgment in the Australian Court where Judge H.B. Higgins ruled that an employer 
must pay his employees a wage which guaranteed the standard of living of “a 
human being in a civilised community".80  This precedent was followed in 
subsequent Australian Court judgements and the idea of a ‘living wage’ soon began 
to appear in New Zealand determinations. 81 
The New Zealand Court began to actively use the RPI to aid its judgments during 
the Great War. Because of the economic effects of its decisions on employers and 
workers, the Court became the most important user of the index which became a 
site of contention in employment relations.  Perceived inaccuracies or perceived 
bias in the index were regularly used to dispute Court decisions from both sides.  
Employers often argued that use of the RPI did not take into account the 
profitability of a particular industry or account for business cycles.  Unions argued 
that use of the RPI to keep pace with the cost of living did not allow workers to 
improve their standard of living, keeping them ‘locked in’ at the living standards of 
1914 (the base of the index).82 
3.12 THE 1920 ‘ERROR’: POLITICS CHANGES THE INDEX 
Attacks against the RPI were seen as attacks on the integrity of the Court and a 
1920 judgement based on incorrect RPI data had significant consequences for the 
development of the index.  At the time the Court had made half-yearly decisions 
on wage adjustments based on a six-monthly moving average of the RPI.  But one 
particular judgment used monthly data which awarded workers a far greater wage 
increase than otherwise warranted.  The mistake was soon identified and in 
response to the controversy the Court requested that the Statistics Office compile 
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a more comprehensive RPI with a greater range of commodities.83 The Office had 
begun to collect prices of clothing and miscellaneous commodities in the previous 
year and this may have contributed to the error. Price movement in the clothing 
group index was calculated by the Office whereas the Court calculated price 
change in this group using its own method.84 The Office commenced the 
compilation of an ‘all-groups’ index in 1921 for the exclusive use of the Court 
which covered 87.5% of 1911 budget survey consumption rather than the previous 
60%.85   
While clothing was now included in the index the specific choices of commodities 
were odd.  Items in the regimen were based on what a family would ‘ordinarily 
wear’.  While men were deemed to have ready-made clothes, price change in 
women’s clothing was measured on the price of materials only.  This was arguably 
a way of avoiding the problem of changing fashions and simplifying the 
measurement of price change. It appears that much of the chosen clothing and 
miscellaneous items were drawn from a UK Board of Trade study.86  A change 
from making six monthly to three-yearly wage awards at the end of 1923 resulted 
in the Statistics Office being granted permission from the Court to publish the ‘all-
groups’ index.  This became the new revised RPI although the public justifications 
for the change were curious.   
The 1920 Statistics Office Report on Prices detailed new wholesale and 
export/producer indexes as well as restating the methodology behind the RPI.  
Techniques for collecting house rent data became more closely aligned with 
Australian methods. In reasoning for continuing to exclude clothing from the 
index the Government Statistician cited “Australian, Canadian and South African 
statistical authorities” as approving of this decision.87 Yet when the all-groups RPI 
was made the official index in 1924, the Government Statistician cited the same 
authorities and the requirements of Empire standardisation to justify the inclusion 
of clothing and miscellaneous items.  While both statements are arguably correct in 
that other Dominions had largely compiled ‘all-groups’ indexes since the 1920 
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Empire Conference, it disguised that the real reason for change had been the 
requirements of the Court of Arbitration.  
3.13 CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
Efforts towards integrating official New Zealand statistics into the international 
system continued throughout the 1920s.  In 1924 Fraser resumed regular New 
Zealand attendance at the Australian Commonwealth and State Statisticians 
Conference.88  On the other hand an invitation to the 1928 17th Congress of the 
International Statistical Institute was declined.89  In 1929 the Government 
Statistician reported on New Zealand efforts at achieving statistical Empire 
uniformity. Fraser noted that the results had been more noticeable among the 
Dominions rather than between the UK and the Empire due to the lack of a 
centralised British statistical agency.90  This was the last mention of Empire 
standardisation by the Government Statistician in an Annual Report to Parliament.  
The economic recession of the 1930s followed by WWII ultimately ended the 
Empire standardisation project. At this time a new international organisation in the 
form of the ILO began to take primacy in setting international statistical standards.   
The ILO was created concurrently with the League of Nations with an operational 
creed that “universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon 
social justice”.91  In the early years of the organisation it was found that much of 
the statistical data required to advance its cause was inadequate.  Thus the ILO 
Bureau of Statistics was created to devise guidelines for the comparable 
measurement of labour statistics including wages, occupations, industrial disputes 
and consumer prices.92 The inaugural International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians (ICLS) was held in 1923 and in 1925 the Conference set out the first 
criteria and guidelines for retail price indexes. Among the resolutions agreed upon, 
an ‘all-groups’ index was codified as an international standard, members were 
invited to conduct new budget studies and 1930 was agreed upon as the future 
base year for each government’s index.93  
                                                          
88
 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1924, ‘Report of the Government Statistician’, H-
22, p. 10 
89
 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1928, A-1, p. 10 
90
 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1929, ‘Report of the Government Statistician’, H-
22, p. 9 
91
 International Labour Organisation, ‘Constitution of the International Labour Organisation’, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO  
92
 ILO Bureau of Statistics, 2008, ‘ILO statistical standards: 85 years of setting international guidelines for 
labour statistics’, Bulletin of Labour Statistics, 2008-1, p. IX 
93
 International Labour Office, 1925, The Second International Conference of Labour Statisticians, Studies and 
Reports Series N (Statistics) No. 8, ILO, Geneva, pp. 69-70 
54 
 
Although New Zealand was a founder member of the ILO this did not reflect a 
special connection to the organisation.  The British had signed up the Empire as a 
whole to the ILO in 1919 and there was some confusion initially as to whether 
New Zealand was actually a member.94 Through the 1920s the New Zealand 
government was largely disinterested in the organisation, declining to send 
representation to any ILO conference. By the end of the decade New Zealand was 
one of only three members to have not sent a delegation to an ILO meeting.95  
While New Zealand did attend the 1930 Conference, it was not until 1938 that the 
then-Labour Government would ratify ILO conventions.96 Yet while New Zealand 
was kept its distance from ILO Conferences and conventions during the inter-war 
period there was some interest in the research activities of the organisation.  ILCS 
and other international standards were keenly followed in the Statistics Office 
during the 1920s with myriad conventions on health, population, trade and 
economic statistics implemented.97   
This standardisation process extended to the RPI; in accordance with the 1925 
ICLS resolution, the Government Statistician conducted a new budget study and 
revised the index using 1930 as a base year. This revision signified a drift away 
from the Australian and Empire principles towards those of the ICLS.  For 
example while the ‘aggregate expenditure’ calculation method derived from 
Australia was retained for the food and fuel groups, the ‘geometric means’ method 
from the ICLS was employed in the clothing and footwear sub-groups.98  The New 
Zealand index also incorporated new items such as fresh fish that remained 
excluded from the Australian iteration.  During the 1930s, publication of actual 
price quotations for many items was discontinued contravening the Empire 
standard that data used in compilation of the RPI should be published.99  
3.14 DEPRESSION, REJUVENATION, POLITICS AND WAR 
The economic depression of the 1930s and subsequent reduction in funding to the 
Statistics Office curtailed much statistical development and the 1930 revision to 
the RPI was to be the last before WWII.  The election of the Labour government 
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in 1935 brought with it a new economic paradigm with the implementation of a 
‘Guaranteed Price’ scheme, greater trade unionism and the bedding in of the 
‘welfare state’.  The new government also amended the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act mandating that the basic wage for adult males was to be fixed at 
such a rate so as to, in the opinion of the Court of Arbitration, be sufficient to 
“enable an man in receipt thereof to maintain a wife and three children in a fair 
and reasonable standard of comfort”.100 
To aid in its plans the Government created a Social Science Research Bureau 
within the Department of Science and Industrial Research (DSIR) to investigate 
social and economic conditions.  The first study conducted by the Bureau was an 
enquiry into the standard of living of dairy farmers which was then followed by an 
investigation into the living conditions of urban workers.  The Bureau was 
supported by Carnegie Corporation which funded the services of an American 
professor of Rural Sociology to advise on international best practice and 
methodology.101 The results of the study into urban workers, completed in 1939, 
found that despite reversals of depression-era salary cuts and the implementation 
of price controls, living conditions generally remained poor among those surveyed. 
The results however did not sit well with the rhetoric of the Government at the 
time and the report was suppressed which prompted the head of the Bureau to 
quit in disgust.102 With the onset of WWII the Bureau was disbanded although the 
findings of the urban workers report would be later used in the wartime 
refashioning of the RPI into the Wartime Price Index.  
To maintain stability in wartime conditions an economic stabilisation plan was 
enacted by the New Zealand Government.  Central to the plan was the creation of 
the Wartime Prices index (WPI) which was used as a check on both state-
controlled prices and wages.  The index replaced the RPI which had become 
unsuitable for austerity conditions (although data collection continued throughout 
the war so as to preserve continuity).  The index was devised by a committee 
representing interests including unions and employers, however the Government 
Statistician was not included in the group.  Weights were based on an 
approximation of the 1942 ‘family standard of living’ utilising the 1930 budget 
study and the 1939 DSIR study. The regimen of the index reflected wartime 
austerity, although in a change from the RPI group weightings were not intended 
to reflect a ‘working class’ standard of living. The index utilised aggregate 
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expenditure for almost all groups and sub-groups and fresh fruit and vegetables 
were included for the first time. The output of the index was also directly linked to 
the wage awards of the Court of Arbitration, although this mechanism was not 
activated during the war.  The WPI was almost entirely the product of the 
domestic considerations of domestic institutions with little consideration for 
international comparability. For example, Australia, although it had also 
implemented economic controls, did not create a special index, instead making 
modifications to its RPI. 
3.15 CREATING AN ‘OBJECTIVE’ CPI 
Post-war New Zealand was a different place, socially and economically to the 
nation that had entered the war in 1939.  For example, New Zealanders were 
increasingly likely to live in urban areas and employed in technologically 
sophisticated industries.  Neither the RPI with its 1930 basis nor the austerity of 
the WPI were adequate measures of price change.  But the outcome of the war had 
also remade the world economy.  The UK was no longer a great power and the 
Western economy was now directed by the United States through the Bretton 
Woods system.  The new economy of the ‘free world’ was a compromise between 
the unrestricted international economic liberalism pre-1914 and the domestically-
focused protectionism of the 1930s.  States co-operated using international 
institutions to facilitate market integration and preserve economic stability while 
retaining sufficient autonomy to pursue domestic agendas such as full employment 
and strong welfare systems.103   
A keen participant in the new internationalism of the post-war era and a founding 
member of the United Nations, New Zealand was eager to demonstrate its 
evolving sense of nationhood on the international stage. This attitude was reflected 
in international statistical development, with active New Zealand participation in 
the ICLS and the newly created United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC).  
But these engagements also brought about new requirements that local statistics be 
compatible with new international frameworks and standards.  Concurrently 
domestic considerations determined what information would be collected and 
what statistics would be produced. In many respects the development of New 
Zealand’s CPI in the post-WWII era reflected the Bretton Woods system.  
Domestic interests and institutions shaped the statistic within the bounds of 
internationally determined norms and standards. 
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George Wood, the then Government Statistician, was essential to New Zealand’s 
post-war statistical internationalism, ensuring that the post-war CPI met 
international standards. Worldly and knowledgeable in statistical methods Wood 
had been part of the Statistics Department since the 1920s. During WWII he had 
worked in the Palestine Statistics Office and after retiring as Government 
Statistician in 1958 he became chair of the UNSC.  The WPI stayed in place in the 
immediate post-war years and the Government Statistician faced considerable 
pressure from domestic interests to revise the index to more accurately reflect 
post-war conditions. Organised labour agitated for ‘modernisation’ of the index as 
they believed the wartime austerity of the WPI would make it difficult for wage-
earners to improve their standard of living.104  But in a letter written to his 
controlling Minister in July 1947, Wood requested that New Zealand follow the 
lead of the UK and delay revising the index until after the 1947 ILCS 
Conference.105  
The premise of the ICLS Conference was “to improve science for the greater well-
being of mankind” and it incorporated emerging influences on international 
statistics including representatives from the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund and the Food and Agricultural Organisation.106  The Conference 
signified the end of passive New Zealand acceptance of international price index 
standards.  While not always greatly influential, New Zealand was now an active 
participant in determining price index norms.  New Zealand’s delegation to the 
Conference consisted of Wood and Jack Baker (then of the Labour Department 
and future Government Statistician), which was greater than many other nations 
including Australia that sent a single delegate.  Wood was an active participant in 
the committee that devised the resolutions on measuring price change, which 
although not comprehensive, set out broad guidelines on the purpose, basic 
methodology and even acceptable nomenclature of price indexes.107   
But at the same time the resolutions were not overly prescriptive, allowing wide 
scope for satisfying domestic needs. For example, choices were made between 
measuring pre-war or post-war consumption patterns and which groups of society 
to encompass. The choice to measure “the post war consumption of the generality 
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of New Zealand consumers” perhaps represents the (actual and imagined) 
egalitarian ethos of the society at the time.108   
In 1948 a committee was organised to formally determine the nature of the post-
war index, although this masked the fact that Wood and his officials had largely 
completed an underlying framework for the new index based on ICLS resolutions 
before the committee had even begun sitting.109  These committees, convened 
every few years from 1948 up until the present day, now known as the ‘Revision 
Advisory Committee’ are the formal arena for political discussion, conflict among 
invited actors with a high level of interest in the framework of the CPI.  
The resulting index, formalised in 1949, represented a significant departure from 
the design of the previous indexes. The idea of reflecting austerity or a ‘working 
class’ standard of living in the index was abandoned with it now designed to 
represent 95% of ‘normal’ household consumption. As such the number of items 
included in the regimen was greatly expanded and in a significant change, owner 
occupied housing was included in the index for the first time. Many countries did 
not include house ownership in their indexes at this time but New Zealand’s 
relatively high rate of owner-occupied homes, as well as the support of both 
unions and employers, justified the change to the Review Committee.110  The index 
returned to the ‘aggregate expenditure’ method of weighting for all groups and 
continued the innovation of the WPI by including fresh fruit and vegetables.  In 
accordance with ICLS recommendations the Department of Statistics was given its 
own cadre of staff to collect prices meaning they would no longer rely on the 
Labour Department for field work.  But perhaps the most noticeable change to the 
lay-person was the renaming of the index to the ‘Consumers’ Price Index’.  The 
name change was an attempt to reinforce the idea that the index was no longer a 
measure of the ‘cost of living’ but an objective measure of the ‘cost of stuff’. The 
index was subsequently formalised in the regulations governing the Court of 
Arbitration which was required in its wage determinations to account for any “rise 
and fall in retail prices by any index published by the Government Statistician.”111 
But the design of the new CPI was not as ‘objective’ as it claimed to be. For 
example, the continued exclusion of alcohol from the index was the result of direct 
political interference. While the report of the Committee cited the exclusion of 
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alcohol from the price indexes of the United States and the former Dominions to 
justify its exclusion, it was actually due to the intervention of the then New 
Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser.  The PM had a puritanical view on the role 
of alcohol in society and did not want beer included in the CPI regimen as that 
could result in workers’ wages being increased to compensate for alcohol price 
rises.  Although the exclusion of beer was odd for an index that was claimed to not 
omit commodities that were “regarded as non-essential or socially undesirable”, 
this was remedied in the 1955 revision after the PM had left office.112 While 
Fraser’s direct interference with the index structure may appear crude by 
contemporary standards, there are parallels with the subtle removal of price 
changes in tobacco from the version of the CPI currently used for benefit 
indexation in New Zealand.  
The post-war CPI symbolised the shifting dynamics of New Zealand in the post-
war and post-colonial world.  It signalled a drift away from colonial ties to 
Australia and the UK towards more active engagement with the international 
community led by the United States. While standards for price index development 
were set externally; it was ultimately domestic politics, including technocratic 
decision-making, power struggles between labour and capital and overtly political 
interventions that determined the exact form of the price index and the effect it 
would have on the economy.   
3.16 HOW POLITICS CHANGED THE INDEX 
This case study has shown how politics changes technology. The CPI was 
originally conceived as a prescriptive tool of social discovery during the First 
World War to ascertain the cost of living for a working family, yet by the 
conclusion of the Second World War, the index had been transformed into an 
objective tool of economic redistribution. This occurred because the primary 
function of the index, evolved from being to investigate the ‘cost of living’ and 
inform social policy, to primarily being a mechanism to determine change in wages 
via the Court of Arbitration. Thus the political weight of the Court and the interest 
groups invested in its determinations assumed greater over the form of the index 
than the original groupings that first devised the index.  Internationally too, the 
political interests that set the economic and social boundaries for New Zealand as 
a state changed, from being a Dominion heavily influenced by the British Empire 
in the early 1900s, by 1949 the international influences on New Zealand were tilted 
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more towards the United States and a new world order transmitted through 
international organisations such as the United Nations and the ILO.  
Almost all of the technology and protocols present in the ‘improved’ CPI 
introduced in 1949 had been developed well before the commencement of the 
Second World War, so it was not technological improvement as a matter of course 
that changed the index, it was the politics surrounding it that altered the form of 
the index. The post-war change to the international political context did not mean 
changes to the index were a fait-accompli among all developed countries either. 
For example, Australia, which the New Zealand index was partially based upon in 
its formative years, was similarly impacted by the war and yet because of 
differences in domestic politics, a corresponding change in the Australian CPI did 
not occur until 1960.113 
The greater power held by the Court of Arbitration and unions following the Great 
Depression, the election of the first Labour Government in 1935 and the Second 
World War meant they held greater veto power over the form of the index.  This 
significant change to the index was the result of a  consensus between the Court of 
Arbitration, the technocrats of the Statistics Office, unions and employer groups 
that broadly agreed to ‘modernisation’ of the index would improve outcomes for 
their interests. This occurred within an international context that permitted and 
arguably encouraged this significant change.  
3.17 INFORMING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE THEORY 
The development and change in the CPI over the first half of the 20th Century is 
pertinent to theories of institutional change. This episode of change in the CPI 
exemplifies aspects of both the path dependence-punctuated equilibrium and the 
gradual-incremental change arguments.  
There appears to be strong evidence in favour of path-dependence. The choice of 
the Statistics Office as the principal technical determinant and ‘gate-keeper’ of the 
index rather than the more ‘activist’ Department of Labour combined with the 
creation of a Court of Arbitration that used the CPI to determine wages were the 
antecedent conditions that constrained and shaped change to the index.  Aside 
from the 1920 ‘error’ with the index which prompted a revision to its 
methodology, changes to the index over its early history largely coincided with 
exogenous shocks, marked by significant price inflation, often caused by war or 
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economic crisis. In this case, the economic and political conditions brought about 
by the outcome of the Second World War was the critical juncture that formalised 
permanent change to the index as an objective positivist measure of price change.  
The critical juncture of the aftermath of the war, rebalanced the post-war global 
system towards ‘embedded liberalism’ in part due to the ascendance of American 
power and the receding power of Europe.  The technocratic role of the Statistics 
Office and the needs of the Court of Arbitration and its surrounding interest 
groups entrenched the function of the CPI in New Zealand’s economy based on 
the antecedent choices made during the First World War to put these institutions 
and interests in control of the index.  
Alternatively, what may appear to be an example of path dependence and change 
caused by exogenous shock may instead have been an example of gradual 
incremental change that occurred largely endogenously through continuous 
struggle among influential actors. The path dependence argument in part relies on 
the role of the Court of Arbitration and its use of the index being largely stable 
since its beginnings, but that was not the case.  The institution of the Court itself, 
and its role in wage setting was the site of on-going power struggles throughout its 
existence and the original decisions that created at the turn of the century by no 
means determined with finality its role in economic redistribution. For periods of 
time, particularly through the late 1920s and early 1930s the Court was largely 
neutered, subsequently minimising the relevance of the index in wage 
determination.114   
The ambiguities in the structure and use of the index were continuously fought 
over by actors in continual struggle for the prevalence of the status quo or change. 
While the shock from the aftermath of war undoubtedly forms of part of the 
explanation for change in the institution of the CPI, the effect of WWII was 
indirect. The period of war temporarily quelled the power struggles between capital 
and labour for, which were renewed anew at its conclusion.  The events after the 
war presented new opportunities for change actors to exploit ambiguities in the 
index which had existed to the side on hold argument suggests that the 1949 
change to the CPI, while ‘inevitable’, had merely been delayed through institutional 
stability and inertia and that only the ‘shock’ of the event of the war prompted its 
occurrence. 
It may be that the layering the economic mechanism of wage determination upon 
the original function of the index as a tool of social discovery ultimately changed 
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the form of the index from a subjective to objective measure. Layering contends 
that new functions are added to institutions alongside existing purposes that 
introduce new actors that bring about change. But the social discovery aspect of 
the early price index was largely vanquished by 1949.  The conversion approach is 
more salient to this story of institutional change as it was the institution of the CPI 
itself that adjusted to meet the needs of the new paradigm.  This first occurred in 
1920 after the ‘error’ in the index caused a wage determination to be rescinded.  
The index was then converted into a form that suited its chief political user. The 
redirection of the CPI’s purpose created further political struggle in what the 
function of the institution should be. This led to compromise among actors and 
interests following WWII to mitigate ambiguities in the enforcement and 
interpretation of its rules.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ‘BRAVE NEW WORLD’: THE CPI AND THE POLITICS 
OF NEO-LIBERALISM 
4.1 SUMMARY 
In 1975, on a unanimous vote, Parliament passed a revised Statistics Act which 
enshrined independence for the Government Statistician.  The legislation specified 
that “The Statistician shall have the sole responsibility for deciding the procedures 
and methods employed in the provision of any statistics produced or to be 
produced by the Statistician.”115 Independence of the Government Statistician had 
been an observed convention for many years, and a code had been in place among 
Ministers from the early 1960s116 this legislative change was explicit in signalling 
that the political interference in the structure of official statistics including the CPI 
was prohibited. While crude interference in the measurement of household 
inflation, such as that of Peter Fraser in 1949, was now officially forbidden, 
technology in the form of the CPI was still subject to change as a result of politics.  
This is because, as was also officially codified in the Statistics Act, official statistics 
were to be fit for purpose and consultation among interested parties was legally 
required to be undertaken by the Government Statistician.117 
This chapter will demonstrate that despite the stated political neutrality of official 
statistics, the CPI changed in the late-1990s as a consequence of political struggle. 
The case study will show that after the CPI became an instrument of monetary 
policy because of the political choice to implement inflation-targeting, the index 
itself changed through the removal of interest rates from the official regimen of 
the index.  Although direct political interference in the structure of the index was 
illegal, by changing or adding to the functions of the index through political 
struggle, which supplanted powerful users of the index in favour of others, the 
form of the statistic itself ultimately changed.  
This chapter will further inform theories of institutional change by examining a 
case study of which there is no immediately apparent exogenous shock that caused 
the removal of the measurement of price change in interest rates from the CPI 
regimen in 1999. Yet this case study could be an example of path dependence due 
to antecedent political decisions to implement inflation targeting as monetary 
policy a decade prior. But this significant change to the price index is also arguably 
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an example of gradual incremental change through shifts in political power and 
context.  
4.2 ‘STAGFLATION’ AND THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM 
While the reasons for New Zealand’s economic decline in the 1970s are often 
disputed, there is agreement among most historians that the decade was a turning 
point in New Zealand’s economic history.  The post-war period from 1945 to 1973 
in New Zealand saw prolonged economic and wage growth, virtually full 
employment and strong terms of trade. Yet the decade from 1975 to 1985 saw a 
slump in economic growth, rising unemployment, declining exports and escalating 
inflation.118 
The causes of what came to be known as ‘stagflation’ (stagnant growth and rapid 
inflation) are linked to a number of external shocks that were felt around the world 
in 1973 such the abandonment of the fixed exchange rates of Bretton Woods and 
the first of the oil shocks.  Domestically, New Zealand had enjoyed largely open 
export access to the British market for its goods since 1840, which became 
increasingly constrained following the United Kingdom’s accession to the 
European Community in 1973.  
The increased focus on the role of inflation in the economy during the decade gave 
the CPI greater prominence as an economic indicator.  At the same time the 
effective abandonment of the Court of Arbitration’s wage setting mechanism in 
the 1970s in favour of national wage bargaining shifted the primary locus of the 
conflict between labour and capital over wages and the CPI mechanism from the 
Court to the negotiating table and central government.119  Typically negotiators 
from both sides of the labour divide in wage negotiations would use the level of 
the CPI as the starting position while arguing over whether other factors could be 
added or subtracted from the inflation baseline.120 
The CPI also underwent significant changes in 1974 by switching from a ‘use’ to 
an ‘expenditure’ method for determining the relative weighting and selection of the 
‘basket of goods’. The ‘use’ approach treated the time period used for weighting in 
which goods or services are used by a household whereas the ‘expenditure’ 
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approach treated items as to when they were paid for by the household.  This had 
significant consequence to the treatment of items such as durable goods which 
would normally be used and paid for over a long time period.  At the same time, 
the bi-annual Household Economic Survey commenced which was used to 
reweight the index on a regular and more ‘scientific’ basis. Importantly, for the 
purposes of this case study, the index now included mortgage interest costs for 
new houses. 
Broadly, the governmental response to the downturn of the 1970s in most 
developed economies, particularly in the Anglosphere, was the adoption of what 
came to be known as neo-liberal or ‘new Right’ economic and social policies. Key 
tenets of the ‘new school’ were deregulation of markets, privatisation and 
corporatisation of government activities and departments along with liberalisation 
of financial markets including unrestricted capital flows and floating exchange 
rates. Continuing the long-held tendency of policy-makers to ‘copy-and-paste’ 
overseas ideas, such policies were introduced in New Zealand from the mid-1980s, 
although with far greater haste and ideological veracity than elsewhere.  
Following the election of the Labour government in 1984, the Treasury presented 
its prescription for salvation from the weak economic growth, rising 
unemployment and high inflation that had plagued New Zealand for the previous 
ten years. In its briefing to the incoming government, while acknowledging 
weakening global economic output and the decline in New Zealand exports 
relative to imports, the Treasury laid most of the blame for poor performance at 
the macro-economic response of the outgoing Muldoon government. The 
Treasury’s plans included market liberalisation, redesign of the welfare state, 
‘flexible’ labour markets and monetarist disinflationary macroeconomic policies.  
4.3 ‘INFLATION TARGETING’ AND THE RESERVE BANK ACT 
Over four terms of Labour and National governments from 1984 to 1996 the 
remodelling of the state and the New Zealand economy as proposed by Treasury 
took place. One of the key planks of this realignment was the introduction of 
‘inflation-targeting’ monetary policy. In the 1988 Budget, the Minister of Finance, 
Roger Douglas announced his plan to change monetary policy so that the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) would “implement policies that make the 
maximum contribution to achieving and maintaining a stable general level of 
prices.”121  
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As inflation escalated in the 1970s, without corresponding economic growth to 
compensate for rapid price change, efforts by economies including New Zealand 
to control the situation were amplified.  The story of state attempts to control 
inflation was that of a ‘search for the holy grail of monetary policy’ - a readily 
applicable rule that exerts control over the value of money.  During the primacy of 
the Bretton Woods system from 1944 to 1971 inflation targeting was not actively 
contemplated by most governments because of its incompatibility with pegged 
exchange rates.  But the collapse of Bretton Woods left a vacuum for new 
monetary policies to be proposed and tested.   
Inflation targeting was associated with the rise of monetarism, an economic theory 
that contends that variation in the money supply influences the output of an 
economy and price levels which is best addressed by controlling the growth of the 
money supply.   This doctrine is commonly associated with Milton Freidman who 
argued that the supposed trade-off between lower unemployment at the cost of 
higher inflation was false. Once people in an economy adjusted their behaviour to 
higher inflation, the economy would return to a so-called ‘natural rate of 
unemployment’.  Therefore, while governments could temporarily lower 
unemployment through higher inflation, once the economy got over the initial 
‘surprise’ and adjusted to the faster rate of price change, employment would 
ultimately return to where it started from but with the higher inflation still in place. 
Therefore it was better to not to use monetary policy to address unemployment 
but to focus on price stability in the medium-to-long term. Governments and 
policy-makers saw some validation in Friedman’s ideas during the 1970s as 
inflation increased without any corresponding decline in unemployment.  
The rise of rational expectations theory in economics during the 1970s was also a 
key element of inflation targeting monetary policy.  In 1977, Finn Kydland and 
Edward Prescott used game theory to demonstrate why fixed rules are preferable 
to the discretion of policymakers.122  This was further developed by Robert Barro 
and David Gordon who contended that rules, discretion and reputation are integral 
to the operation of monetary policy.123 124  Extending that framework further, 
Kenneth Rogoff argued that economies will be better off through the appointment 
of a central banker who places greater weight on a stable rate of inflation-rate 
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relative to the rate of employment.125  Tempering this idea, Susanne Lohmann 
argued that better outcomes are achieved if the government retains the right to 
override an independent central banker during extreme economic crises.126 Both 
Rogoff and Lohmann agree on the importance of the government’s choice of 
central banker, arguing that government select central bankers whose preferences 
and conduct of monetary policy maximise the government’s expected utility.  
Under the National government of 1975-1984, officials within both Treasury and 
the RBNZ had been proponents of the new monetarism of Milton Freidman but 
were largely ignored by Robert Muldoon, who was both Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance.  But upon taking office in 1984 Roger Douglas instructed the 
RBNZ to devise plans to ‘Muldoon-proof’ monetary policy.127   Thus officials 
within the central bank and Treasury set about devising new monetary policy 
regimes and operational structures for the bank.   
In a 1986 memorandum to Douglas, RBNZ officials proposed that the central 
bank should have full operational independence as that would provide a 
“disciplinary check on various other policies, notably fiscal policy”.128   In a later 
paper the bank also proposed that by having a single objective of price stability it 
would be better able to achieve its goal while other state agencies could focus on 
economic objectives such as full employment.129 In briefing papers presented to 
the re-elected Labour government in 1987, Treasury encouraged Roger Douglas to 
follow a new monetary policy based on rules, credibility and transparency and to 
make stable and low inflation its top priority.130  The briefing papers provided by 
the RBNZ simultaneously reinforced the proposals for a singular focus on price 
stability while devoting a substantial section of the brief to the importance of 
autonomy for the bank.131  
To speed up implementation of the reforms, associate Minister of Finance and 
trained economist Peter Neilson was delegated to find a mutually agreeable 
position for the Bank and Treasury. After consulting with officials at the United 
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States Federal Reserve Board and the central banks of Canada, Germany and the 
UK as well as a variety of neo-liberal academics, Neilson came to the conclusion 
that the RBNZ needed a strong decision-maker with personal credibility who had 
the integrity to resign if his or her policies were interfered with by government.  In 
early 1988, Neilson informed Douglas that he favoured more precision and clearer 
quantification of the ultimate inflation target.  Neilson also proposed that the 
target be set by the government which would be codified in a contract signed 
directly with the Governor rather than the central bank.132  Soon after his 
discussion with Neilson, Douglas publically set inflationary expectations in a 
television interview where he stated that the aim of his monetary policy would be 
to reduce CPI inflation to ‘around 0, or 0 to 1 per cent’ within two years.133  The 
pledge of Douglas was widely mocked in the media at the time.  
The dismissal of Douglas as Finance Minister in late 1988 proved to be no 
impediment to the implementation of the monetary policy, if anything it sped up 
the process as it gave new Minister David Caygill the opportunity to demonstrate 
his commitment to neo-liberal ideas.  Outside of government, there was some 
opposition to the inflation targeting regime, particularly the singular objective of 
price stability, from union groups, the Manufacturers’ Federation, some academics 
and the National Council of Women.  On the other hand, the policy was largely 
supported by groups such as the Business Round Table, Federated Farmers as well 
as neo-liberal academics.  Because it was presented as a ‘scientific truth’ as part of a 
wide-ranging neo-liberal paradigm shift the revolutionary monetary policy received 
relatively little public attention despite the salience of inflation among the public.  
There were just 23 submissions received by the Select Committee that deliberated 
on the details of the legislation.134 The insignificant levels of media coverage 
regarding the new policy belied the significance of the legislation to the 
management of the New Zealand economy.  
While there was some opposition to the changes within the governing Labour 
Party and the opposition National Party, it was largely muted and in 1989 the 
Reserve Bank Act was passed unanimously by Parliament.  The legislative 
codification of inflation targeting in the Act states that “The primary function of 
the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the economic 
objective of achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices.”135 As 
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the most prominent public measure of ‘price stability’ the CPI became an essential 
component of the new inflation targeting regime. The politics that added this new 
function to the CPI would, in turn, ultimately change its form.   
4.4 THE CPI AND THE ‘POLICY TARGET AGREEMENT’ 
The design of the monetary regime stipulated that the inflation target would be set 
by the government in consultation with the RBNZ.  This target was 
contractualised in the form of a ‘Policy Target Agreement’ (PTA) between the 
Reserve Bank Governor and the Minister of Finance.  The Governor would be 
personally responsibly if inflation exceeded the target within the short-term of one 
year.  If inflation went outside the range the Governor had to explain to parliament 
why the breach occurred and face the possibility of dismissal if the breach was 
egregious. The PTA was designed to make the Governor publicly accountable and 
give the bank a more corporatist structure in line with the emphasis on ‘outputs’ 
that had recently been imposed on the wider public sector.  On the other hand, by 
making a single person responsible for meeting the target could increase the 
possibility of policy mistakes.  
While there were a number of potential options to assess whether the Governor 
had met the goal of price stability, the CPI was chosen as the contractual target 
because “it was widely known and was an inflation measure that most people were 
familiar with.”136  Despite the ubiquity of the CPI, the PTA acknowledged that the 
index was “not an entirely suitable measure” of price change for the new monetary 
policy.  As Brian Easton notes “it could be argued that the choice of consumer 
prices in the target agreement neither follows logic or common sense” as private 
household consumption makes up around 60% of economic activity of which 40% 
is consumption via imports through which, other than the exchange rate, New 
Zealand has little influence over the cost of.137  A statistic that measured inflation 
in the whole economy, such the GDP deflator or a suite of measures may have 
been more suitable but for the public awareness of the CPI.  In addition, as the 
CPI was commonly used in wage negotiations, the index set expectations of 
employers and workers as to the expected level of wage increases which in turn 
affected the level of ‘underlying inflation’ the bank aimed to control.  
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Those points aside, the CPI was considered unsuitable as a target by the bank 
particularly because the index directly included interest rate costs.138 According to 
inflation targeting theory, adjusting monetary policy by increasing interest rates 
would, in the medium term, tend to lower inflation.  But increasing interest costs 
would - ceteris paribus – increase CPI inflation in the short term, possibly pushing 
price change outside the boundaries of the agreed target, thus violating the 
Governor’s contract with the Minister. Thus the CPI was enshrined as the inflation 
target for “practical purposes” but the RBNZ was permitted to devise an 
alternative index of ‘underlying inflation’, the Housing Adjusted Price Index 
(HAPI) which excluded interest rates and purchases of existing houses.139 The 
PTA specified if there was forecast deviation in annual inflation of at least half a 
percentage point between the CPI and the HAPI, the Governor and the Minister 
could renegotiate the agreement to “take account of the deficiencies in the 
construction of the CPI.”140  Although the HAPI was discontinued in 1992, the 
bank continued to use alternative ‘underlying inflation’ measures (such as CPI 
excluding interest costs), alongside the ‘official’ CPI measure specified in the PTA 
until 1997. 
4.5 THE 1997 CPI REVISION ADVISORY GROUP 
This ambiguity between the CPI as a target and the goal of the RBNZ to maintain 
‘price stability’ was ultimately exploited by the Bank, Treasury, the financial sector 
and central government to change the form of the index. Despite the enshrined 
political independence of the Government Statistician, he was also legislatively 
required to produce statistics to meet the needs of its users.  The CPI has multiple 
and occasionally conflicting uses, of which the monetary policy use has greater 
political and institutional power supporting it than the others, therefore it was only 
a matter of time until the index was remodelled towards those requirements. The 
power imbalance between those that used the CPI for indexation relative to those 
that supported its use in monetary policy was further exacerbated by the 
introduction of the Employment Contracts Act which increased ‘flexibility’ in 
labour relations and weakened the political power of the union movement. This 
law also cemented the societal shift away from the expectation for employers to 
pay a ‘living wage’ based on fairness and the ‘cost of living’ as under the Court of 
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Arbitration and towards wage increases being “justified by productivity 
improvements.”141 
In 1971 the Minister of Statistics set forth a review of the CPI which utilised a 
Revision Advisory Committee (RAC) of interested parties invited to discuss and 
make recommendations to the Government Statistician regarding the structure of 
the index and its suitability for its users. This committee was based on the 
precedent set from the review of a similar group in 1948, and a principal 
recommendation of the 1971 committee was that such reviews should be carried 
out on a regular basis going forward. These reviews ensured that the index was 
meeting the purposes of its users. Since then reviews of the CPI by the RAC have 
been carried out in 1978, 1985, 1991, 1997, 2004 and 2013. Generally, the 
recommendations of the RACs were implemented within 2 years of their reports, 
although not all recommendations to the Government Statistician were ultimately 
adopted. 
From 1948 until 1997 the committee was chaired by the Government Statistician. 
The Statistician stood aside from the RAC from 2004 onwards, ostensibly because 
the purpose of the committee was to give independent recommendations of the 
users of the index to the Government Statistician to decide upon. As the 
Statistician was not a user and was rather the arbitrator of the index structure, the 
chairpersonship was handed over to an ‘independent’ person so as to ensure the 
RAC provided independence of the RAC. In 2004 the committee was chaired by 
retail bank economist John McDermott and in 2013 by the former Retirement 
Commissioner, Diane Crossan, previously a manager at AMP, a financial services 
company. These choices of chairperson demonstrate the interest groups that the 
CPI is now prioritised to serve.  
Although membership of the committee is ultimately determined by the Statistics 
Department and its Minister, the changing composition of representatives on the 
RAC also shows how the influential actors in the construction of the index have 
changed over time. It however must be noted that although the composition of the 
committee is not the sole source of public and interest group input, public 
submissions were called for by each RAC, although numbers tended to be very 
low. As Table 2 shows, from 1971 to 1997 the committee generally comprised a 
wide cross-section of the users of the index.  Until 1991, there were relatively few 
representatives of government departments and notably the 1971 RAC that 
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recommended the inclusion of mortgage interest in the index was the only 
committee to not include a Treasury representative. As the CPI has taken on 
greater importance in the financial sector and in macro-economics the size and 
scope of the committees has narrowed. The 2004 and 2013 RACs comprised just 
three interest group representatives alongside a number of persons appointed for 
their expertise (although that is not to say they were not representing interests in 
some form). But the modification in the size and scope of the RAC from 2004 
onwards can also be linked to the highly contentious report of the 1997 committee. 
 
TABLE 2: CPI REVISION ADVISORY COMMITTEES 1971-2013 
1971 1978 1985 1991 
Chair 
Government 
Statistician 
Chair 
Government 
Statistician 
Chair 
Government 
Statistician 
Chair 
Government 
Statistician 
Representatives of Representatives of Representatives of Representatives of 
Statistics Dept. Treasury Treasury Treasury 
Public Sector Unions Statistics Dept. Statistics Dept. Statistics Dept. 
Trade Unions Public Sector Unions Dept. of Trade Reserve Bank 
Women Trade Unions Trade Unions Labour Dept. 
Retailers Women Women Social Welfare 
Dept. 
Employers Retailers Retailers Commerce Dept. 
Farmers Employers Employers Trade Unions 
Consumers Farmers Farmers Women 
 Consumers Consumers Retail Banks 
Experts Experts Experts Farmers 
Academic (Statistics) Academic(Statistics) Tech. Consultant Employers 
Academic(Economics)   Manufacturers 
   Consumers 
   Experts 
   Tech. Consultant 
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1997 2004 2013 
Chair 
Government Statistician 
Chair 
Bank Economist 
Chair 
Public Servant (Finance) 
Representatives of Representatives of Representatives of 
Treasury Business Business 
Statistics Dept. Trade Unions Trade Unions 
Reserve Bank Social Services Reserve Bank 
Commerce Dept. Experts Experts 
Social Welfare Dept. Academic (Economics) Economist (Commercial) 
Trade Unions Academic 
(Statistics) 
Academic 
(Business Management) 
Retailers Technical Consultant Technical Consultant 
Employers  Academic (Statistics) 
Farmers   
Manufacturers   
Retail Banks   
Experts   
Technical Consultant   
 
In 1985, at a time of rapid change in the state sector and the wider New Zealand 
economy the RAC proposed that there be little change to the CPI as it was “an 
authoritative, independent, unbiased measure of the level of price inflation as it 
affects households and that the index is acceptable to its wide range of users.”142  
In 1991, soon after the index began to be used in the conduct of monetary policy, 
the committee again declined to “propose any radical alterations” to the structure 
of the index emphasising “the essential soundness of the present Consumers Price 
Index.”143  But there was a significant point of contention among committee 
members. Appearing for the first time on the committee, the Reserve Bank 
opposed the continued inclusion of mortgage interest within the CPI regimen but 
was not supported in its opposition by any of the other representatives.144 
During the 1990s the Reserve Bank experienced teething problems with the new 
inflation targeting monetary policy.  While the rate of inflation had fallen to 
historical lows in the early 1990s, there was a continuing issue with deviation 
between the ‘headline’ CPI which was the basis of the Policy Targets Agreement 
and ‘underlying’ inflation, i.e. the long run trend that excludes transitory price 
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changes, which the bank aimed to control.  By 1994 annual headline inflation had 
increased to 2.8%, well above the 0-2% target range, although underlying inflation 
was still within the range.145  The bank at that time was producing its own 
calculation of underlying inflation but it was decided by the bank and Minister to 
adopt the methodology of Statistics New Zealand for removing interest costs from 
the CPI which increased the level of underlying inflation.  The bank also continued 
to emphasise its focus on the underlying target even though the contract between 
the Minister and the Governor was based upon headline CPI inflation. This caused 
confusion amongst the public and drew allegations of inconsistency against the 
bank.146147 
The Governor exceeded the target range on both underlying and headline CPI 
inflation during 1995 and 1996 which further dented the credibility of Governor 
Don Brash and the inflation targeting regime. But it was the communication 
problems between the differing measures that gave renewed vigour to the bank’s 
demands that Statistics New Zealand remove interest costs from the headline 
index. This was especially important as inflation targeting theory is based on 
expectations and credibility.  If ‘rational’ economic actors are confused by the 
signalling of the bank due to multiple measures of inflation how are they to adjust 
expectations for inflation?  
The meetings of the 1997 Revision Advisory Committee were highly contentious.  
As the committee report states “The variety of views expressed by committee 
members on the form of the CPI was more diverse than had occurred in any of the 
previous five reviews; public submissions reflected the same diversity of views.”148 
The recommendations that were presented were compromises because “the 
balance of opinion expressed by committee members did not fall strongly in 
favour of specific direction with regard to any single measure.”149   
The bank approached the 1997 RAC proceedings armed with technical arguments 
and research to justify the removal of interest charges from the index. Treasury, 
which for reasons unknown supported the maintenance of mortgage interest in the 
1991 review, steadfastly argued for its removal in a more overtly political manner. 
Although the public positions of other committee members are officially unknown, 
the support of employers, farmers and retail banks were also corralled behind the 
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RBNZ and Treasury. On the other side, representatives of trade unions and 
consumers, and it was rumoured that at one point, the Government Statistician 
himself, supported mortgage interest rates remaining in the index.150  
Although the reason for the bank’s advocacy of the removal of interest from the 
index were due to its communication and conduct of monetary policy, the bank 
claimed it was not approaching the committee with a “narrow perspective” solely 
focussed on the CPI as a monetary policy tool.151  Instead the bank presented its 
arguments ‘scientifically’, based around what the CPI ‘should’ measure.  Despite 
the conflicting objectives between the differing uses of the CPI that necessitated 
compromise and pragmatism, the bank contended that a “clear conceptual basis” 
for the index was “an essential starting point, if not the end point, for all of its 
potential uses.”152  
The RBNZ argued that there was no room within its “clear conceptual basis” for 
mortgage costs stating that “interest rates do not belong in the CPI”. The bank 
argued that interest rates were not consumption and did not fall within the Oxford 
English Dictionary definition of a service.  Rather that interest charges were the cost 
of bringing consumption forward over time, but were not an act of consumption 
in itself.  The bank also cited a number of other countries that did not include 
interest charges in their version of the CPI, while acknowledging that other 
countries did include this item and that other economies had multiple indexes for 
multiple purposes. A number of international studies and research from bank 
officials that supported the position were also provided.  
Treasury largely echoed the views of the Reserve Bank, although disagreeing with 
the bank on the inclusion of ‘imputed rentals’ for owner-occupied housing due to 
the difficulty of applying that measure to New Zealand’s relatively high home 
ownership rate, although later changing that view to match that of the RBNZ. 
Unlike the bank, Treasury argued for the importance of removing interest costs for 
the purposes of monetary policy so as to reduce ‘volatility’ in the index. Treasury 
also worked with their Australian counterpart to co-ordinate this change to the 
CPI which was not coincidentally also proposed in Australia at the same time.  
Treasury also argued that over the long-term there would be no difference to the 
indexation levels provided by the CPI for benefits and wages as lower inflation 
during times of high interest rates would be evened out by relatively higher 
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inflation during periods of low interest rates. This argument, however, made little 
allowance for changing life patterns, while the change may be neutral over a decade 
or longer, a person may only receive a childcare or student allowance for a 
relatively short period of time at a time of high or low interest costs which are not 
being adequately compensated for.  
4.6 THE ‘INTEREST-FREE’ CPI 
Despite the opposition to the arguments of the Reserve Bank and Treasury, the 
defenders of the status quo were outnumbered.  As the committee report states 
“the balance of the arguments has shifted in favour of an official measure of 
consumer price change which excludes the cost of servicing debt.” This 
demonstrates the shift in political power and the political environment since the 
1991 committee of which only the Reserve Bank supported the exclusion of 
interest costs. The committee ultimately agreed, by majority decision, to remove 
interest costs from the headline CPI (along with other conceptual changes 
including the shift to an ‘acquisitions-based’ model for the index which are not the 
focus of this chapter) to better support monetary policy.    
Some members were opposed to this change but the committee was able to reach 
an understanding on how changes to the treatment of debt service costs would be 
possible. It was considered practical to exclude such costs from the CPI as long as 
a range of other measures of price change and purchasing power were also 
developed. This would ensure that public confidence was maintained in the 
available measures of the impact of price change on households. 
To compensate for the change to the main CPI it was unanimously agreed by the 
committee that alternative indexes (including an ‘outlay-based’ that included 
interest costs and real disposable income indexes) would be developed that could 
be used for other purposes such as indexation of benefits and wage negotiations. It 
was agreed that the new ‘interest-free’ headline CPI would not be introduced until 
the alternative indexes became available.  This did not eventuate. While Statistics 
New Zealand went ahead with the removal of interest from the index in 1999 in 
accordance with the majority view of the committee, the alternative indexes that 
were unanimously agreed to by the RAC were never produced.   
One month after the committee recommendations were published, the Reserve 
Bank Governor and the Treasurer signed a PTA.  The agreement, signed 
December 15 1997, officially replaced the CPI target with the CPIX – CPI 
excluding interest costs. In the background note to the agreement, it was explained 
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that the CPIX target would likely change in 1999 because of the “Government 
Statistician's intention to drop interest rates from the official CPI in that year.”153 
Although there was some qualifying language in the background note, this 
expectation suggested confidence from the RBNZ and the Treasurer that the 
Government Statistician would implement the committee recommendations even 
though he was under no obligation to do so. There were no corresponding moves 
from the Department of Social Welfare or the Department of Labour to prepare 
for the introduction of the alternative indexes for the purposes of benefit 
indexation or in wage negotiations.  
In an update on the 1997 recommendations provided to the Treasurer and the 
Minister of Finance by Treasury in September 1998, it is noted that the committee 
recommended the development of alternative indexes but no progress report is 
provided. In the same report Treasury contradicts the view of the RAC and 
Statistics New Zealand by stating that the revised CPI is “more appropriate as a 
measure of the cost of living.”154  Despite the view of the revision committee that 
the new alternative measures would be required to be produced prior to the 1999 
introduction of the new CPI to “maintain public confidence in the measurement of 
price changes affecting households” when formally requested in 2001, funding for 
the measures was jointly rejected by Treasury, Statistics New Zealand (under a new 
Government Statistician) and the department’s ‘External Advisory Committee’.155  
On October 29 1999, Statistics New Zealand published its revised CPI for the 
September 1999 quarter with interest costs excluded from the basket of goods.  
One day prior, the Reserve Bank announced a “minor technical change” to its 
inflation target that replaced the CPIX with the new CPI. Ten years after the 
introduction of inflation targeting, politics had changed the definition of inflation.  
This chapter demonstrates how political change to the function of the CPI and the 
political environment it operates within ultimately changed its function. In the 
1985 the major use of the index was “in wage adjustment, negotiations and as a 
basis for maintaining the purchasing power of other forms of household 
income.”156 By 1997 the role of the CPI had changed because “current economic 
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policy lies in reducing the exposure of the New Zealand economy to inflation and 
leaving market determined incomes unadjusted in most situations.” As of 2013, the 
principal use of the CPI was not to measure the purchasing power of consumers 
but “to inform monetary policy setting”.157  Despite the legislated independence of 
the Government Statistician to design the form of official statistics, the function  
to which these numbers were used for were ultimately political decisions made by 
political actors.  
4.7 INFORMING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE THEORY 
This episode of change in the institution of the CPI is instructive to the theory of 
institutional change.  As with the prior case study there are two broad theoretical 
explanations of change that this episode can inform: a path-dependence-critical 
juncture model and an incremental change-layering model.  Both approaches are 
useful explanations.  
The path dependence approach is salient as it can be argued that the original 
decision to introduce inflation targeting with the CPI integrated into monetary 
policy locked in a path that led to the eventual change in the index. In addition, the 
decision to use the CPI in monetary policy was due to the prevalence of public 
awareness of the index.  This can itself be linked back to the choice of the Court of 
Arbitration to utilise the index in wage determinations which locked the CPI in the 
public mind as the trusted measure of the ‘cost of living’.  Therefore any future 
efforts to control inflation would necessitate reference to the CPI.   
The critical juncture in this explanation is the exogenous shock that occurred to 
the New Zealand economy in the 1970s.  The oil shocks, abandonment of Bretton 
Woods and the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community 
ended the ‘golden weather’ of the post-war economy. This created the antecedent 
conditions initially resisted (and arguably exacerbated) by the Muldoon government 
that enabled the rapid introduction of market and state reforms by the fourth 
Labour government in 1984.  
The shortcomings of this theoretical explanation are the defining of ‘sudden shock’ 
of the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s and the response to it. The shock was arguably not 
‘sudden’ but prolonged and the responses to it were multiple and varied. The ‘think 
big’ asset building programme and the price freeze of the Muldoon government, 
while largely criticised afterwards were policy responses that were directly linked to 
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antecedent conditions just as the post-1984 neo-liberal response was.  That two 
vastly different policy responses to the 1970s ‘shock’ does not directly suggest 
there was path dependence and that the institution of the CPI was changed 
because of a punctuated equilibrium. On the other hand, many developed 
economies ultimately chose similar responses following the 1970s crisis, however 
there were significant differences between economies, with a broadly similar 
approach of deregulation but divergent implementations.158 
The path dependence argument around the creation of inflation targeting monetary 
policy that eventually changed the CPI in to fit the needs of the new regime 
appears inadequate.  While the choice of the CPI as a monetary policy mechanism 
influenced the structure of the index, the outcome that eventuated was not pre-
destined.  Had the proposal for the creation of alternative indexes been followed 
through, the CPI may have instead been supplanted as the default measure of the 
‘cost of living’ for the purposes of indexation and wage negotiation.  
This case study, even more so than the previous, suggests that the path 
dependence-critical juncture model has limitations that prevent a complete 
understanding of why and how institutions change over time.  Again the 
incremental model for institutional change appears to be more instructive. In this 
circumstance the ‘layering’ approach is the more instructive typology of 
incremental change.  Despite the collapse of the wage determination mechanism of 
the Court of Arbitration, the CPI was firmly entrenched as an indexation tool to 
maintain purchasing power and mitigate increases in the ‘cost of living’ and 
remains so today.  As such ‘conversion’ of the CPI did not occur.  
Layering of the monetary policy mechanism upon the existing intractable existing 
functions of the CPI occurred that created a new dynamic and empowered actors 
such as the Reserve Bank, Treasury and the broader financial sector to bring about 
change to the index.  It also altered the perspective of actors such as merchants, 
exporters and employers towards the index. The intent of using the CPI in 
monetary policy was not to supplant the existing system, rather the public 
credibility of the index was used to support the new institution of inflation 
targeting. Yet this decision, in time, created new ambiguities that were exploited by 
actors with increased power over the institution that in turn changed the outcomes 
produced by the index.  
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The explanation provided by ‘layering’ demonstrates the worth of the incremental 
approach in explaining institutional change. Although it is arguable over what time 
period constitutes ‘sudden’ compared to ‘incremental’ change this case study is a 
strongly exemplifies incremental change. It shows that a changing political 
environment can create conditions that bring about new interpretations of rules 
and institutional processes reshaping institutions through the empowerment and 
disempowerment of political actors. For political reasons, additional functions 
were layered upon the CPI changing the status and structure of the institution. 
Although the CPI was not displaced as an indexation tool, the addition of the 
functional layer of monetary policy remade the form of the institution through 
political struggle.  
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
5.1 SUMMARY 
This thesis has demonstrated that it is not technology that changes politics, but 
that politics changes technology. The CPI had its beginnings in what was once an 
inquiry into the minimum requirements of a ‘worthy’ working family required to 
purchase ‘necessities’ and was transformed by a series of political decisions into a 
tool that set the price of labour and then into a tool that also set the cost of capital. 
The case studies detailed showed that technology, much like wider society is just as 
susceptible to change through political struggle.   
Protecting the ‘independence’ of technology through legislation or technological 
improvement cannot prevent the influence of politics if technology is used to 
implement political decisions and actions. This thesis also shows that further 
development of technology enables politics to change pre-existing technology even 
further.  Technological improvements in the structure of the CPI, in some 
respects, made it easier to make political changes to the index, especially so after 
the CPI began to be used in the conduct of monetary policy.  
The first case study showed that the CPI was converted through political processes 
by its attachment to the modification of wages.  Putting what was initially devised 
as a tool of social discovery into the conflict between labour and capital ultimately 
reshaped the device.  The struggle among political forces over time caused change 
when a consensus among them was reached following World War II that remade 
the CPI into an ‘objective’ measure based on average family outgoings rather than 
that of a ‘working-man’.  
The second case study demonstrated that through layering an additional function 
upon the existing purposes of the index, new political forces became involved in 
the struggle over the index.  These forces, broadly representing the financial sector, 
had greater political strength than their opponents and were able to bring about 
institutional change that suited their preferences. Despite the legislated political 
independence given over to the construction of official statistics, change occurred 
because the supposedly ‘apolitical’ index was used to perform highly political 
functions of redistribution.  
5.2 INFORMING THEORETICAL RESEARCH 
This thesis adds to the body of knowledge on historical institutionalism and 
institutional change.  The case studies suggest that the idea of path dependence and 
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related theories are underdeveloped and at times inadequate.  The examples of 
change through political struggle in the CPI surrounding the Court of Arbitration 
and the monetary policy of the Reserve Bank demonstrates the merit of the 
incremental change theories devised by Thelen.  This body of work from which 
the concepts of layering and conversion have emerged fit the story of political 
change in the CPI well but more research is needed to refine and further add to 
this engaging area of political and historical research.  
Theoretical areas that require further inquiry are around what constitutes 
‘significant’ change and what is to be considered ‘incremental’ or ‘sudden’.  The 
question of why some political actors that should be influential at bring about 
political change to institutions are seemingly from the political struggle that brings 
about change needs further examination.  Regarding the second case study, why 
was the Department of Labour seemingly absent from the political struggle that led 
to the removal of interest costs from the CPI? Although actors and interests of the 
labour movement were on the ‘losing’ side in this struggle over the institution of 
the CPI, interests such as labour unions were not absent. Why were the Reserve 
Bank and Treasury, critical actors in regards to the latter study, almost entirely 
absent from the first case study? 
5.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE CPI 
This thesis raises many areas for further research in the epistemology of the CPI 
and the broader role of official statistics.  As the field of price index research 
broadens, comparative case studies will need to be undertaken to show the 
different paths of development that indexes and other statistics take over time. In 
particular, case studies showing the relative political and technological 
development of the Australian and New Zealand price indexes will yield valuable 
insights into why and how these statistics have developed in the way they have.  As 
closely related economies with similar international and domestic political 
influences and interests, the story of why the indexes of the two states diverged 
from the 1920s through to the 1970s and then became more closely harmonised in 
the 1990s should prove to be a fruitful area for further research.  
As the CPI has become more technologically sophisticated, ‘manipulation’ of its 
indexation mechanism has become easier for political actors. Recently, the New 
Zealand government legislated for large increases in excise taxes on tobacco. This 
would have had a flow on effect on the indexation of benefits and other transfer 
payments linked to the CPI.  To avoid the increased expenditure, the Government 
84 
 
legislated for benefit payments to be linked to the ‘CPI excluding tobacco’.159 This 
was possible due to the technological changes made to the CPI in the 1990s that 
compartmentalised the index.   
While this incident was not ‘manipulation’ or direct interference in the structure of 
the index as was conducted by Peter Fraser in the 1940s in relation to the inclusion 
of alcohol, it was arguably a debasement of the intent of ‘objective’ ‘cost of living’ 
increases.  The ‘CPI excluding tobacco’ still includes goods and services such as 
the price change of overseas travel and luxury items that from one perspective, 
should not affect ‘cost of living’ increases for benefit payments. Demonstrating 
what an overtly political act this decision was, the Government continues to use a 
version of the CPI that includes tobacco prices for the annual indexation of excise 
duties including alcohol, tobacco and fuel. During Parliamentary debate on this 
issue, the opposition Labour Party called for an inquiry into how the CPI is used to 
index Government payments and receipts.160 This is also an area that deserves 
further academic inquiry.  
5.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH REGARDING OFFICIAL 
STATISTICS 
The ability of governments to enact policy changes that involve the transfer of 
billions of dollars over time with very little regard from the public is another area 
for further inquiry.  As Culpepper has noted in his theory of ‘Quiet Politics’ 
regarding corporate control of politics, ‘noisy politics’ surrounds issues that have 
“high salience” to the electorate, politicians thus adjust their positions to meet 
voter preferences on these issues.  ‘Quiet politics’ occurs in the context of issues 
with “low salience”, such as the structure and implementation of price indexes to 
which most voters are largely indifferent.  Within the context of “low salience” 
issues that are important high-level business and elites, it is possible to use this 
‘information asymmetry’ to bring about legislative and regulatory outcomes that 
elites prefer.161 Although Culpepper applies this theory to laws of corporate 
governance in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan, this theoretical 
framework has strong applicability to the study of price indexes and official 
statistics in general.  
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The story of change in the CPI is also instructive to what change may occur with 
regards to newer forms of constructed knowledge such as happiness indicators and 
carbon emission measurements.  The story of the CPI shows that the original 
intent of an institution can be altered significantly over time through politics. As 
newly developed statistics are applied for political purposes, which interest groups 
will emerge and engage in political struggle over their structure and application, 
and what transformations could occur that change them?  
Relatedly, what could happen to existing statistics such as measures of the balance 
of payments if such numbers are placed within critical political areas such as 
monetary policy?  For example, The New Zealand Labour Party recently proposed 
adding the ‘external balance’ to the price stability target of the Reserve Bank.162 If 
implemented what effect could that have on the measure of the current account 
balance, if any?  
Further to this, the story of the CPI informs research into the area of official 
statistics. Is there too much reliance on such numbers in politics and policy-
making? Given the increased sophistication of technology in the 21st Century, is it 
time to reduce the political and social emphasis on aggregate measures of 
‘unemployment’ and ‘GDP’ that can obscure as much as they enlighten? There is 
an argument that more bespoke statistics that focus narrowly on specific policy 
areas could produce better outcomes. Furthermore, there is also an argument that 
there is already too much focus by policy-makers on numbers, whether narrow or 
broad in scope and more attention needs to be paid to causes rather than 
quantification. 
5.5 THE FUTURE OF THE CPI 
That the CPI as an institution changed by political struggle means the index is not 
insulated from further political change. For example, the recent campaign by 
interests representing labour agitating for a ‘living wage’ could, if successful over 
the medium term, return the CPI towards more closely representing the concept of 
a ‘cost of living’ measure rather than a macro-economic statistic that caters for the 
interests of the financial sector.  The recent announcement of Statistics New 
Zealand that once again, there will be further investigation of alternative indexes to 
better represent the interests of labour could ultimately dislodge the CPI from its 
ubiquitous and multi-layered position as a ‘catch-all’ statistic that serves multiple 
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purposes simultaneously.163 But as this thesis has demonstrated, the political 
context that the index operates within determines which interests and actors wield 
sufficient political power to control, and if willing, alter the index system to better 
suit their preferences. Yet in the contemporary political environment, it seems 
unlikely the index will be reshaped or created anew to better suit the purposes of 
income adjustment. Instead with new ambiguities being introduced into the CPI 
system, such as the treatment of tobacco, there may need to be a total reworking of 
how people keep up with the ‘cost of living’ that does not involve indexation. 
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